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RECENT CASES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-RACIAL RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS
-ALLOWANCE OF DAMAGES FOR BREACH
Plaintiff and other property owners in the same block entered into a
written covenant that no owner, his heirs or assigns should sell, lease or
give away any property in the block to any person of the Negro or African
race. The defendant owners conveyed to a financially irresponsible person
who conveyed to Negroes. Plaintiffs allege a conspiracy to impair the
value of their property and ask that the sale be cancelled and damages to
the extent of $10,000.00 be awarded. The trial court sustained general
demurrers to the petition and dismissed the action. Held, reversed. Al-
though the trial court was correct in refusing to nullify the transfers, it
should have allowed a trial to determine plaintiffs' damages because of
defendants' breach of the covenant. Correll v. Earley, 237 P.2d 1017 (Okla.
1951).
Since the Civil Rights Cases' it has become well established that the
Fourteenth Amendment is a prohibition on state action of every kind which
denies to any citizen the equal protection of the laws.2 However, it was
recognized that the Amendment was no barrier to action by private in-
dividuals. 3 For nearly three-quarters of a century the majority view of
the federal and state courts has been to allow the enforcement of covenants
between individual land owners restricting the use, occupancy and sale of
property to minority groups.4 Thus, only state and municipal legislation
permitting segregation was objectionable as violating the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.5
1. 109 U.S. 3, 3 Sup. Ct. 18, 27 L. Ed. 835 (1883).
2. United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 639, 1 Sup. Ct. 601, 27 L. Ed. 290
(1882); Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 25 L. Ed. 676 (1879); Virginia v. Rives,
100 U.S. 313, 25 L. Ed. 667 (1879). See Crooks, The Racial Covenant Cases, 37 GEo.
L.J. 514 (1949).
3. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11, 3 Sup. Ct. 18, 27 L. Ed. 835 (1883).
4. E.g., Chandler v. Zeigler, 88 Colo. 5, 291 Pac. 822 (1930) ; Lee v. Hansbury,
372 Ill. 369, 24 N.E.2d 37 (1939); United Cooperative Realty Co. v. Hawkins, 269
Ky. 563, 108 S.W.2d 507 (1937); Swain v. Maxwell, 355 Mo. 448, 196 S.W.2d 780
(1946). Contra: Gandolfo v. Hartman, 49 Fed. 181 (C.C.S.D. Cal. 1892). See
Baker, Restrictive Covenant Cases Reviewed, 3 S.C.L.Q. 351 (1950).
5. E.g., City of Richmond v. Deans, 281 U.S. 704, 50 Sup. Ct. 407, 74 L. Ed.
1128 (1930) ; Harmon v. Tyler, 273 U.S. 668, 47 Sup. Ct. 471, 71 L. Ed. 831 (1927) ;
Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 38 Sup. Ct. 16, 62 L. Ed. 149 (1917); Glover v.
Atlanta, 148 Ga. 285, 96 S.E. 562 (1918) ; Note, 3 A.L.R.2d 474 (1949).
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In 1948 the restrictive covenant cases6 were decided, and resulted in
a repudiation of most of the views previously expressed by the Court. In
the historic case of Shelley v. Kraemer7 the Supreme Court held that the
enforcement of racial restrictive covenants by state courts in the form of
injunctive relief was unconstitutional as state action. The court recognized
the validity of the agreement as between the individual parties but rendered
it unenforceable. 8 The question of enforcement of such a covenant by an
allowance of damages for the breach thereof was not before the Court.
Consequently there has been some uncertainty since this decision as to its
effect on the right to maintain an action for damages.
There have been only a few decisions since the Shelley case in which
the question has been raised, 9 and their inconsistencies indicate that the
matter has not been clarified. In Roberts v. Curtis'° the court gave a broad
interpretation of the Shelley case. The view was that "although the actions
involved . . . were suits for injunctions, the ruling is broad enough to
cover actions for damages as well."" It was decided that "judicial assist-
ance" of any kind for the enforcement of racial restrictive covenants was
prohibited by the Shelley case. In Weiss v. Leaon'2 the Missouri Supreme
Court construed the Shelley case to have a limited effect. Although the
court refused to grant injunctive relief, it did allow enforcement of the
covenants by an action for damages. The court reasoned that though one
remedy, specific performance, is ruled out because of constitutional reasons,
that need not necessarily affect the remedy by way of damages unless it is
also unconstitutional under the circumstances.' 3
6. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 68 Sup. Ct. 836, 92 L. Ed. 1161, 3 A.L.R.2d
441, 2 VAND. L. REv. 119 (1948) ; Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24, 68 Sup. Ct. 847, 92 L.
Ed. 1187 (1948). These decisions probably attracted as much public attention and
interest as any in recent years. See Ming, The Restrictive Covenant Cases, 16 U. oF
Cm. L. REv. 203 (1949).
7. 334 U.S. 1, 68 Sup. Ct. 836, 92 L. Ed. 1161, 3 A.L.R.2d 441 (1948).
8. It has been suggested that this decision raises the question of whether or not
the enforcement of all private acts of discrimination is forbidden by the Fourteenth
Amendment since they ultimately depend upon state sanction. Hyman, Segregation
And The Fourteenth Amendment, 4 VAND. L. REV. 555, 565 (1951). "In holding that
a covenant is valid and yet unenforceable, the court overlooked the case of Van
Hoffman v. City of Quincy (4 Wallace 535), [18 L. Ed. 403 (1866)] holding that
a right without a remedy is as if it were not; that the inability to enforce a contract
leaves nothing but an abstract right of no practical value and renders the protection
of the Constitution a shadow and a delusion." Askew, Restrictive Covenant Cases,
12 GA. BJ. 277, 283 (1948).
9. Roberts v. Curtis, 93 F. Supp. 604 (D.D.C. 1950), 3 BAYLOR L. REv. 584,
13 GA. B.J. 372, 2 SRAcusE L. Ray. 367 (1951) ; Weiss v. Leaon, 359 Mo. 1054, 225
S.W.2d 127 (1949), 30 B.U.L. R v. 273, 18 GEO. WASH. L. Ray. 417, 63 HARv. L.
REv. 1062, 21 TENN. L. REv. 141 (1950).
10. 93 F. Supp. 604 (D.D.C. 1950).
11. Ibid.
12. 359 Mo. 1054, 225 S.W.2d 127 (1949).
13. This reasoning appears to be subject to debate in that the Shelley case does
not object to the manner of enforcement, but to enforcement per se.
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The instant case follows the view adopted by Weiss v. Leaon. The court
reasoned that since the Shelley case did not declare restrictive covenants
invalid, an owner who conveyed to a Negro purchaser acted at his peril
by subjecting himself to a suit for damages for breach of a valid contract
between himself and other lot owners.1 4 The court recognized that the
Shelley case precluded it from rendering "judicial enforcement" in the form
of an injunction, but it saw no constitutional inhibition against utilizing
the judicial machinery for the assessment and collection of damages. It has
been suggested that the distinction between these two forms of coercion is
too slight to justify different conclusions when two types of relief are sought
separately. 5 The threat of a suit for damages would probably be a sufficient
deterrent to prevent most land owners from selling or leasing their property
in violation of restrictive covenants. Thus, if damages are allowed, the
covenants may be enforced by indirect means.'6 It should be noticed, how-
ever, that the instant case was reversed and remanded not to determine the
question of damages for breach of the contract, but to determine damages for
the alleged conspiracy. The defendant sought to evade liability on the
contract by first conveying to a financially irresponsible white person, who
was to convey to Negroes. The court held that such conduct amounted to
a conspiracy to violate a valid and binding contract.'
7
The underlying question appears to be whether or not enforcement by
allowing damages is "state action" within the purview of the Fourteenth
Amendment.' s Ultimately it will take a decision of the United States
Supreme Court to resolve the conflict on this question. As to how the
Supreme Court will handle the problem one can only speculate. A com-
ment on the Shelley case four years- ago in this Review discussed various
legal devices which might be considered in an effort to attain the result
previously accomplished by racial covenants and concluded that "it is
14. Another question raised by the instant case is whether in fact any monetary
damage was actually caused by the sale of property to a Negro. Plaintiffs alleged
that their property was reduced in value by $10,000 because of the presence of
Negroes, but it is questionable whether such a claim could be sustained in a court of
law.
15. Hyman, Segregation And The Fourteenth Amendmnent, 4 VAND. L. REv. 555,
568 (1951).
16. See 63 HARv. L. Rav. 1062 (1950). In 18 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 417, 418 (1950),
it is said that "The Missouri Court [Weiss v. Leaon] is seeking to do with its left
arm what the Supreme Court has forbidden it to do with its right."
17. The court, by finding liability in tort, appears to have adopted an effective
means of preventing parties to such a contract from escaping liability by conveying to
insolvent third parties.
18. For cases defining state action see Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust & Savings Co. v.
Hill, 281 U.S. 673, 680, 50 Sup. Ct. 451, 74 L. Ed. 1107 (1930) (legislative, executive
or administrative acts); Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 90, 29 Sup. Ct. 14,
53 L. Ed. 97 (1908) (judicial acts); Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S.
226, 233-235, 17 Sup. Ct 581, 41 L. Ed. 979 (1897) (all the instrumentalities of the
state-legislative, executive and judicial).
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reasonable to assume that court enforcement of any device adopting a similar
policy of racial exclusion will not be upheld". 19 Developments since that
time have given no occasion to alter that conclusion. It seems likely that
the Supreme Court will not approve the distinction drawn in the instant
case, although there is basis for making a distinction if the Court is so
inclined.
CORPORATIONS-PARENT AND SUBSIDIARY-SUBSIDIARY AS
INSTRUMENTALITY OF PARENT WHEN USED TO CARRY
ON UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES
General Motors Acceptance Corporation was engaged in the business
of buying conditional sales contracts from automobile dealers "with re-
course," which meant the dealer had to make good to GMAC any losses
sustained if the buyer failed to make payment. Nonrecourse companies
were established, thus causing keen competition among the finance com-
panies for the dealers' business. In order to combat these companies,
GMAC from time to time remitted to the dealers certain sums known as
"dealer participation." The legislature passed a statute delegating power
to the Banking Commission to regulate these practices. The Banking Com-
mission promulgated rules defining "dealer participation" to include any
amount collected from any retail purchaser as a finance or insurance charge
which shall come to or be retained by a dealer. The rules also set out
minimum and maximum amounts allowed for "dealer participation," and
declared exceeding these limits to be an unfair trade practice. The Motors
Insurance Corporation (MIC) was incorporated as a wholly owned sub-
sidiary of GMAC and wrote the insurance required by GMAC on all
vehicles sold under conditional sales contracts. MIC appointed the dealers
as its agents and paid them a commission on each premium. The Com-
mission included these insurance commissions received from MIC in its
computation of the "dealer participation" chargeable to GMAC. GMAC
brought an action for a declaratory judgment on the validity of the rule of
the Banking Commission. Held, the rule is valid. The Motors Insurance
Corporation and the General Motors Acceptance Corporation are in sub-
stance only separate names for a single entity. General Motors Acceptance
Corporation v. Commissioner of Banks, 258 Wis. 56, 45 N.W.2d 83 (1950).
19. 2 VAND. L. REv. 119, 123 (1948).
1952]
VANDERBILT LAW. REVIEW
There is a great deal of confusion in the law as to the legal responsi-
bility of parent companies for their subsidiaries.1  Generally a parent
and its subsidiaries are, without more, considered as separate and distinct
entities with each being held responsible only for its own acts and obliga-
tions.2  But if the subsidiary is a mere department or subdivision of a
unified economic enterprise, there may be no compulsion to give the sub-
sidiary recognition as a separate concern for all purposes. Thus, con-
venience or fairness toward a particular claimant may indicate that liability
should be imposed on the parent.
3
In formulating a basis for predicating liability the courts have variously
used the "agency," 4 "identity,"5 or "instrumentality" 6 theories. All of these,
1. "The whole problem of the relation between parent and subsidiary corporations
is one that is still enveloped in the mists of metaphor." Berkey v. Third Avenue Ry.,
244 N.Y. 84, 155 N.E. 58 (1926). See 6A FLmcECER, Cyc. CoRp. § 2821 (Pern. ed.,
Jones, 1950).
2. STEVENs, Co'olRATioxs § 17 (2d ed. 1949) ; Ballentine, Separate Entity of Parent
and Subsidiary Corporations, 60 Am. L. Rrv. 19 (1926).
3. Consolidated Rock Products Co. v. Du Bois, 312 U.S. 510, 61 Sup. Ct. 675,
85 L. Ed. 982 (1941) ; Taylor v. Standard Gas & Eelectric Co., 306 U.S. 307, 59 Sup.
Ct. 543, 83 L. Ed. 669 (1939); Industrial Research Corporation v. General Motors
Corporation, 29 F.2d 623 (N.D. Ohio 1928) ; United States v. United Shoe Machinery
Co., 234 Fed. 127 (E.D. Mo. 1916) ; United States v. Milwaukee Refrigerator Transit
Co., 142 Fed. 247 (C.C.E.D. Wis. 1905); People v. Michigan Bell Telephone Co., 246
Mich. 198, 224 N.W. 438 (1929).
4. The use of the term "agent" seems unfortunate as it may tend to confuse; an
express agency is not meant in this article. As to actual agency, express or implied,
as basis, see Pacific Can Co. v. Hewes, 95 F.2d 42 (9th Cir. 1938). For "agency" as
used in the context here, see New York Trust Co. v. Carpenter, 250 Fed. 668 (6th
Cir. 1918).
5. In the "identity" theory the separate corporate entity of the subsidiary is dis-
regarded and the parent and subsidiary are regarded as one. This theory is exempli-
fied in United States v. Lehigh Valley R.R. Co., 220 U.S. 257, 31 Sup. Ct. 387, 55 L.
Ed. 458 (1911), and also in Minifie v. Rowley, 187 Cal. 481, 202 Pac. 673 (1921).
Other terms variously used by the courts which connote the same meaning are:
"adjunct," "branch," "dummy," "buffer," "tool," "creature," "mouthpiece," "alias,"
"device," "corporate double," "business conduit" and "alter ego."
6. As to the instrumentality doctrine see Taylor v. Standard Gas & Electric Co.,
306 U.S. 307, 59 Sup. Ct. 543, 83 L. Ed. 669 (1939) ; Fish v. East, 114 F.2d 177 (10th
Cir. 1940); Douglas and Shanks, In-sulation from Liability Through Subsidiary
Corporations, 39 YALF L.J. 193 (1929). In Fish v. East, supra, at 191, the court said:
"The determination as to whether a subsidiary is an instrumentality is primarily a
question of fact and degree. The following determinative circumstances are recognized:
(1) The parent corporation owns all or majority of the capital stock of the sub-
sidiary. (2) The parent and subsidiary corporations have common directors or
officers. (3) The parent corporation finances the subsidiary. (4) The parent corpora-
tion subscribes to all the capital stock of the subsidiary or otherwise causes its in-
corporation. (5) The subsidiary has grossly inadequate capital. (6) The parent
corporation pays the salaries or expenses or losses of the subsidiary. (7) The
subsidiary has substantially no business except with the parent corporation or no
assets except those conveyed to it by the parent corporation. (8) In the papers of
the parent corporation, and in the statements of its officers, 'the subsidiary' is referred
to as such as a department or division. (9) The directors or executives of the sub-
sidiary do not act independently in the interest of the subsidiary but take direction
from the parent corporation. (10) The formal legal requirements of the subsidiary as
a separate and independent corporation are not observed."
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however, have essentially the same meaning: under the circumstances the
parent corporation so dominates and controls the subsidiary that the acts
or obligations of the latter will be chargeable to the parent.7 Evidentiary
factors considered by the courts are: (1) underfinancing of the subsidiary ;8
(2) separate or joint accounts;9 (3) joint officers;1°  (4) common di-
rectors;11 (5) the parent's treating the assets of the subsidiary as its own; 1 2
(6) direct control by the officers of the parent;13 (7) intervention of di-
rectors of the parent with the directors of the subsidiary;14 and (8) any
general intermingling of management or confusion of the affairs of the
parent with the subsidiary corporation.15 The courts will also usually look
to see if the subsidiary is being used by the parent to perpetrate a fraud,
to evade a statute, or to do some illegal or unjust act.' 6 Generally no one
of the above factors by itself is sufficient evidence to declare the subsidiary
an instrumentality of the parent, but this does not mean that a court would
always require more than one to reach an equitable result. For example,
ownership by the parent of a majority or even all of the stock of the sub-
sidiary and the existence of common officers and directors have frequently
7. Madden v. Mac Sir Bar Paper Co., 103 F2d 974 (6th Cir. 1939), cert. denied,
308 U.S. 556 (1939); Universal Oil Products Co. v. Derby Oil & Refining Corp., 19
F. Supp. 821 (D.N.J. 1937); Lowendahl v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 247 App. Div. 144,
287 N.Y. Supp. 62 (1st Dep't), aff'd, 272 N.Y. 360, 6 N.E.2d 56 (1936).
8. Luckenbach S.S. Co. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 267 Fed. 676 (4th Cir. 1920);
Wallace v. Tulsa Yellow Cab Taxi & Baggage Co., 178 Okla. 15, 61 P2d 645 (1936).
9. Joseph R. Foard Co. v. Maryland, 219 Fed. 827 (4th Cir. 1914); In re Muncie
Pulp Co., 139 Fed. 546 (2d Cir. 1905) ; see In re Watertown Paper Co., 169 Fed. 252
(2d Cir. 1909).
10. Taylor v. Standard Gas & Electric Co., 306 U.S. 307, 59 Sup. Ct. 543, 83
L. Ed. 669 (1939); Fish v. East, 114 F.2d 177 (10th Cir. 1940); Henry v. Dolley,
99 F.2d 94 (10th Cir. 1938) ; In re Burntside Lodge, Inc., 7 F. Supp. 785 (D. Minn.
1934).
11. Cases cited note 8 supra. Also see Jenkins Petroleum Process Co. v. Western
Oil Corp., 21 F. Supp. 550 (D. Del. 1937).
12. Edward Fin'h Co. v. Robie, 12 F.2d 360 (8th Cir. 1926); Ross v. Penn-
sylvania R.R., 106 N.J.L. 536, 148 Atl. 741 (1930); accord, Wenban Estate, Inc. v.
Hewlett, 193 Cal. 675, 227 Pac. 723 (1924).
13. Costan v. Manila Electric Co., 24 F.2d 383 (2d Cir. 1928); The Willem
Van Driel, Sr., 252 Fed. 35 (4th Cir. 1918).
14. Fish v. East, 114 F.2d 177 (10th Cir. 1940); see Trustees System Co. of
Pennsylvania v. Payne, 65 F.2d 103, 105 (3d Cir. 1933).
15. Costan v. Manila Electric Co., 24 F.2d 383 (2d Cir. 1928); Westinghouse
Electric Manufacturing Co. v. Radio-Craft Co., 291 Fed. 169 (D. N.J. 1923); accord,
Keokuk Electric Ry. & Power Co. v. Weismann, 146 Iowa 679, 126 N.W. 60 (1910).
See also BALLENTINE, CORPORATIONS §§ 133-37 (1946); Notes, 24 CALIF. L. REv.
447 (1936), 26 IowA L. REv. 350 (1941).
16. United States v. Lehigh Valley R.R., 220 U.S. 257, 31 Sup. Ct. 387, 55 L. Ed.
458 (1911); J.J. McCaskill Co. v. United States, 216 U.S. 504, 30 Sup. Ct. 386, 54
L. Ed. 590 (1910); Palmolive Co. v. Conway, 43 F.2d 226 (W.D. Wis. 1930);
United States v. Milwaukee Refrigerator Transit Co., 142 Fed. 247 (E.D. Wis.
1905). Contra: Federal Gravel Co. v. Detroit & M. Ry., 248 Mich. 49, 226 N.W.
677 (1929) ; Beale v. Kappa Alpha Order, 192 Va. 382, 64 S.E.2d 789 (1951).
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been held insufficient for the subsidiary to be considered as an instru-
mentality of the parent.
17
In the instant case the court considered the following factors as tending
to show that the MIC was an instrumentality of GMAC: (1) the MIC
NWas a wholly-owned subsidiary; (2) MIC did not write complete auto-
inobile coverage but only the. insurance required. by GMAC on vehicles
sold .on its time sales plan; (3) no separate application for insurance
was made to MIC; (4) GT\IAC advertised the insurance as part of a "one
package plan"; and (5) in the various documents used in the GMAC
plan the insurance charges were referred to as "territorial charges."1 8 The
fact that MIC is a wholly-owned subsidiary is not sufficient, in and of itself,
to indicate unity with GMAC, but along with the other four factors
enunerated it clearly shows that MIC's'business was obtained from GMAC
and run in its behalf. This case presents another situation in which a court,
'having' coisgidered the evidentiary factors of close association, has declared
tfle" subsidiary corporation to be a mere instrumentality of a parent corpora-
tion. In the light of the complexities of our corporate enterprise system
and of the possibilities of injury to innocent parties which result from its
abuses, this extension of the instrumentality rule seems wise and expedient
as applied to cases involving unfair trade practices.
.EVIDENCE-ADMISSIBILITY OF CONFESSION-SCOPE OF REVIEW OF
COURT-MARTIAL BY COURT OF MILITARY APPEALS
Petitioner, a private in the United States Army, was suspected of having
stolen money in various camp barracks. At 4:00 a.m. he was pulled from
his bed, forced to lie on the floor and, with a bayonet at his back, was ques-
tioned by an acting platoon sergeant and a military policeman. While he
was being questioned in this manner, a search of his clothing disclosed a large
sum of money. Petitioner then confessed that he had stolen the money. -le
was then confined and eleven hours later was again questioned by agents of
.the Criminal Investigation Department and was warned that any statements
he made could be used against him. Petitioner thereupon made a written
statement admitting his guilt. Four days later, after the same warning, he
made a similar confession. Upon these later confessions he was found guilty
17. Shepherd v. Banking & Trust Co. of Jonesboro, 79 F.2d 767 (6th Cir. 1935) ;
Kingston Dry Dock Co. v. Lauke Champlain Transportation Co., 31 F.2d 265 (2d
Cir. 1929); Majestic Co. v. Orpheum Circuit, Inc., 21 F.2d 720 (8th Cir. 1927);
Owl Fumigating Corp. v. California Cyanide Co., 24 F.2d 718 (D. Del. 1928), aff'd,
30 F.2d 812 :(3d Cir. 1929).
18. 45 N.W. 2d at 87.
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by a general court-martial and the conviction was affirmed by the Board of
Review. Defendant appealed to the United States Court of Military Appeals.
Held, affirmed. The court is bound by the finding of the court-martial that
the subsequent confessions were not rendered inadmissible by the prior co-
erced confession. United States v. Monge, U.S. Ct. Mil. App. No. 9, Jan. 8,
1952 (Mim. release).
As between state and federal courts several distinctions exist in the
rules of evidence and procedure .applicable to the admission of confessions.
The most important involves the scope of appellate review in each system.
In the state courts final determination of admissibility is largely a matter for
the trial court to decide.1 Whether that decision is by judge, jury, or both,2
the state appellate courts will rarely review it unless it reveals a gross abuse
of discretion or is clearly contrary to the evidence.3 On the other hand, the
scope of review by the United States Supreme Court of procedure in lower
federal courts is entirely different. The Supreme Court, despite the lower
co&t's conclusion, reserves the right to inquire independently into the facts
to' determine the producing cause of a confession. 4 In determining whether
the reception of a confession by a lower federal court or by a state court
violated due process, -the Supreme Court will accept the findings of the lower
court as to what actually occurred in securing the confession; that is, the
objective facts, but it will draw its own conclusion as to whether these facts
1. See 3 WIGMIORE, EVIDENCE §§ 861-62 (3d ed. 1940); McCormick, Some Prob-
lents and Developments in the Admissibility of Confessions, 24 TEXAS L. REv. 239
(1946). For an interesting look into the historical aspects of involuntary confessions
in general, see Morgan, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 34 MINN: L. REv.
1. (1949).
2. 'In a number of jurisdictions, including federal courts, the jury is instructed to
disregard evidence of a confession unless they find the requisite preliminary facts, and
in a very few there is an indication that the judge need not pass upon the preliminary
questions if the evidence is conflicting. United States v. Carignan, 342 U.S. 36, 45, 72
Sup. Ct. 97, 102 (1951) ; Commonwealth v. Polian, 288 Mass. 494, 498, 193 N.E. 68, 70
(1934); State v. Custer, 336 Mo. 514, 80 S.W.2d 176 (1935); Yarbrough, v. State,
95 Tex. Cr. 36, 252 S.W. 1069 (1923).
3. See Galas v. State, 32 Ariz. 195, 256 Pac. 1053 (1927) ; State v. DiBattista, 110
Conn. 549, 148 Atl. 664 (1930),; State v. Dowell, 47 Idaho 457, 276 Pac. 39 (1929);
People v. Barber, 342 Ill. 185, 173 N.E. 798 (1930) ; Mack v. State, 203 Ind. 355, 180
N.E. 279 (1932); People v. Mummiani, 258 N.Y. 394, 180 N.E. 94 (1932); Commoi-
wealth v. Farrell, 319 Pa. 441, 181 Atl. 217 (1935) ; 3 WIGM-ORE, EvIDENCE § 861 (3d
ed. 1940). Since Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 56 Sup. Ct. 461, 80 L. Ed. 682
(1936) there is a possibility of review by the United States Supreme Court where the
accused claims a violation of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. The
trend is toward a close surveillance in these cases. See Harris v. South Carolina, 338
U.S. 68, 69 Sup. Ct. 1354, 93 L. Ed. 1815 (1949); Turner v. Pennsylvania, 338 U.S.
62, 69 Sup. Ct. 1352, 93 L. Ed. 1810 (1949); Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 69 Sup.
Ct. 1347, 93 L. Ed. 1801 (1949) ; Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 68 Sup. Ct. 302, 92 L. Ed.
224 (1948) ; Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 60 Sup. Ct. 472, 84 L. Ed. 716 (1940).
4. See, e.g., Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 69 Sup. Ct. 1347, 93 L. Ed. 1801 (1949) ;
Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 64 Sup. Ct. 921, 88 L. Ed. 1192 (1944); Lyons
v. Oklahoma, 322 U.S. 596, 64 Sup. Ct. 1208, 88 L. Ed. 1481 (1944) (notice especially
Justice Murphy's dissent at 605) ; Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 62 Sup. Ct. 280,
86 L. Ed. 166 (1941) ; Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 60 Sup. Ct. 492, 84 L. Ed. 716
(1940).
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amount to such coercion as to make reception of the evidence a violation of
due process. The decisions reveal that a confession must be completely free
from coercion to be admissible in a federal court under the Fifth Amendment
or in a state court under the Fourteenth Amendment.5
Another definite distinction between the state and federal rules stems
from the question of whether or not facts discovered as the result of a
coerced confession may be put in evidence. Generally in the state'courts such
evidence has been held admissible.6 Whether the reception of such evidence
as a basis for conviction in a state court would violate the Fourteenth Amend-
ment has not been decided, however. In the federal courts the decisions on
coerced confessions and cases under the Fourth Amendment and the Fed-
eral Communications Act tend to show that facts discovered as the result
of a coerced confession cannot be put in evidence.7 Although the Supreme
Court's policy in this respect has been criticized as control of police activity
by indirect action," it is reasonable to assume that its effect will be to cut down
the use of "third degree" methods by excluding evidence obtained as a
result of such practices.
Under the Uniform Code of Military Justice, the Court of Military
Appeals serves the same function in the administration of military justice as
the United States Supreme Court serves in the civilian system. The rules
of evidence and procedure applied by the military courts are those used in
the federal district courts except where changed by presidential regulation. 10
Consequently, the decisions of the Supreme Court on the admissibility of
confessions would seem to furnish a safe guide for this court to follow. In
effect, the Court of Military Appeals should apply the same rule in excluding
coerced confessions in military proceedings as the Supreme Court applies in
5. Upshaw v. United States, 335 U.S. 410, 69 Sup. Ct. 170, 93 L. Ed. 100 (1948) ;
Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 64 Sup. Ct. 921, 88 L. Ed. 1192 (1944) ; Inbau,
The Confession Dilemma in the United States Supreme Court, 43 ILL. L. REv. 442
(1948) ; see also, Note, 4 RUTGERS L. REv. 669 (1950). It must be remembered that the
United States Supreme Court in its supervisory capacity requires the rejection of con-
fessions obtained during illegal detention whether coerced or not, because of the violation
of a federal statute. In the instant case the mere questioning by the acting sergeant
was a violation of the Code.
6. See, e.g., State v. Tonn, 195 Iowa 94, 191 N.W. 530 (1923) ; People v. Defore,
242 N.Y. 13, 150 N.E. 585 (1926) ; State v. Cocklin, 109 Vt. 207, 194 Atl. 378 (1937) ;
Atkinson, Admissibility of Evidence Obtained Through Unreasonable Searches and
Seizures, 25 COL. L. REv. 11 (1925).
7. See, e.g., Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 34 Sup. Ct. 341, 58 L. Ed. 652
(1914) ; Brain v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 18 Sup. Ct. 183, 42 L. Ed. 568 (1897);
United States v. Nardone, 127 F.2d 521 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 316 U.S. 698 (1942).
8. Atkinson, Admissibility of Evidence Obtained Through Unreasonable Searches and
Seizures, 25 COL. L. REv. 11 (1925) ; Waite, Evidence-Police Regulations by Rules of
Evidence, 42 MIcH. L. REv. 679 (1944).
9. UmiF. CODE OF M.. JusT. art. 67, 64 STAT. 129 (1950), 50 U.S.C.A. 654 (1951).
10. Id. art. 36.
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the federal courts. The Manual for Courts-Martial provides them with the
authority to do so.
11
In the instant case there appears to be no dispute as to the facts. The
first confession was extracted from the accused in flagrant violation of his
rights under military law.' 2 The validity of the second confession was there-
fore the issue before the court. The determination of this issue under both
state and federal decisions would depend upon whether the influence of the
"third degree" technique which produced the first confession had worn off.'8
The presumption would be that it had not, until rebutted by the prosecution.14
So far as the opinion in this case reveals, the prosecution had not overcome
that presumption. From the opinion it appears that the accused, after ap-
parently improper questioning, was placed under arrest and confined. He
had no opportunity to consult counsel while so confined and since he was only
eighteen years old and was of rather low intelligence, it seems doubtful that
he was aware of his rights. Eleven hours later, when the confession in ques-
tion was obtained, he was apprised of his rights, but was not told that the
first confession could not be used against him. With these facts before them
the law officer, the court-martial and the Board of Review concluded that the
effects of the first confession had worn off during the eleven-hour confine-
ment. In affirming the lower court's decision, the Court of Military Appeals
seemed to apply the rule used in the state courts of refusing to review the
decision of the lower tribunal that the influence of the prior coercion had
worn off.' 5 Under similar circumstances the Supreme Court has reserved
that function to itself.'"
The result of the instant decision and paragraph 140(a) of the Manual for
Courts-Martial,'7 which allows the admission in evidence of facts resulting
from a coerced confession, is to give military prosecutors almost unlimited
11. MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL ff 140(a) (1951).
12. UNIF. CODE OF MiL. JUST. art. 31.
13. See Harris v. South Carolina, 338 U.S. 68, 69 Sup. Ct. 1354, 93 L. Ed. 1815
(1949) ; Turner v. Pennsylvania, 338 U.S. 62,'69 Sup. Ct. 1352, 93 L. Ed. 1810 (1949) ;
Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 69 Sup. Ct. 1347, 93 L. Ed. 1801 (1949) ; Haley v.
Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 68 Sup. Ct. 302, 92 L. Ed. 224 (1948); McNabb v. United States,
318 U.S. 332, 63 Sup. Ct. 608, 87 L. Ed. 1819 (1943); Chambers v. Florida, 309
U.S. 227, 60 Sup. Ct. 472, 84 L. Ed. 716 (1940) ; State v. Force, 69 Neb. 162, 95 N.W.
42 (1903) ; Lang v. State, 178 Wis. 114, 189 N.W. 558 (1922). In the federal courts,
Upshaw v. United States, 335 U.S. 410, 69 Sup. Ct. 170, 93 L. Ed. 100 (1948) ; Anderson
v. United States, 318 U.S. 350, 63 Sup. Ct. 599, 87 L. Ed. 829 (1942) ; 1 GREENLEAF,
LAW or EVIDENCE § 221 (16th ed. 1899) ; 2 WHARTON, CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 601 (11th
ed. 1935) ; WIGMORE, CODE OF EVIDENCE § 1103 (3d ed. 1942) ; Note, 22 So. CALIF. L.
REV. 300 (1949).
14. See note 12 supra. See also, Smith v. State, 74 Ark. 397, 85 S.W. 1123 (1905);
People v. Sveetin, 325 Ill. 245, 156 N.E. 354 (1927) ; State v. Chaves, 27 N.M. 504,
202 Pac. 694 (1921) ; Lang v. State, 178 Wis. 114, 189 N.W. 558 (1922).
15. See notes 1 and 3 mipra.
16. See notes 4 and 5 supra.
17. MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL ff 251 (1951).
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possibilities of obtaining convictions which stem from coerced confessions. To
offset this danger, the Court of Military Appeals should reserve for itself the
final determination of whether or not Article 31 of the Uniform Code of Mili-
tary Justice has been violated. If such a violation is found, the court may
then reverse, even if there is evidence independent of the coerced confession
which'would be sufficient to convict.1s
li United States v. Clay"0 the Court of Military Appeals asserts: "Pre-
viously adjudicated federal court cases are a source from which we can test
the prejudicial effect of denying an accused the rights we have set out as our
pattern of 'military due process'."20  In view of this statement, the decision
in the instant case should not be construed as setting up a fundamentally
different due process standard for civilian and military courts. 21 Nor does
this decision necessarily prevent the Court, in its position as a supreme mili-
tary court and under the federal court precedents, in scrutinizing rulings on
the admissibility of confessions; from applying the technique of the United
States Supreme Court.
22
EVIDENCE-CONFLICT OF LAWS-APPLICATION OF DOCTRINE OF
RES IPSA LOQUITUR
'Plaintiff, a passenger on defendant's plane which crashed in Indiana,
brought suit for his injuries in a New York federal court. The trial court
held the rule of res ipsa loquitur applicable and instructed the jury that a
presumption of negligence existed which the defendant could overcome by
showing no negligence. Defendant appealed from a judgment for plaintiff.
Held, reversed. The New York conflict of laws rule is applicable' and New
York holds res ipsa loquitur to be a procedural rule of evidence governed by
the law of the forum; under this law, res ipsa loquitur is a matter of inference
18. See Mialinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 404, 65 Sup. Ct. 701, 89 L. Ed. 1029
(1945).
19. 1 U.S.M.C.A. 74 (Case No. 49, Nov. 27, 1951).
20. Id. at 78.
21. Even conceding the view that the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment
has no application to courts-martial-a very debatable concession-the Uniform Code
of Military Justice makes it clear that the reception of a coerced confession would violate
a fundamental right of the accused, granted by congressional mandate. UNIF. CoDE or
MI.. JUST. art. 31. See Stein, Jidicial Review of Determinations of Federal Military
Tribunals, 11 BROOKLYN L. REv. 30 (1941).
22. McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 63 Sup. Ct. 608, 87 L. Ed. 1819 (1943)
(where it is said that principles governing the admissibility of evidence in federal
criminal trials are not restricted to those derived solely from the Constitution, the
Supreme Court can set its own standard.)
1. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 61 Sup. Ct. 1020, 85




rather than presumption and does not shift the burden of proof to .the de-
fendant in any way. Lobel v. American Airlines, 192 F.2d 217 (2d Cir. 1951).
The rule of conflict of laws that matters of substance are governed by the
law of the locus and matters of procedure by the law of the forum' is uniformly
accepted. 2 The rationale of the rule is that to require the courts of the foru.l
to know or ascertain and apply the procedural rules of foreign states would.
impose an intolerable burden on them.3 Thus, the lex fori determines 'the.
proper court, the form of action, the time the action was commenced, and
matters pertaining to the execution of judgment.4
It is generally stated that questions of evidence are procedural matters
to be determined by the lex fori.5 Questions' of competency of witnesses6 and
admissibility of evidence7 are almost alw2 ys governed by the law of the "forunm,
although under some circumstances it might be argued otherwise.
8  (in the
other hand, it is everywhere recognized that conclusive presumptions are ".mat-
ters of substantive law and determined by the lex loci.9
2. 3 BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 584.1 (1935) ; GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAws 227
(3d ed. 1949)-; STUMBERG, CONFLICT OF LAWS 134 (2d ed. 1951) ; Morgan, Choice of:Law
Governing Proof, 58 HARv. L. REv. 153 (1944) ; Note, 43 HARv. L. REv. 1134 (1930).
3. 3 BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 584.1 (1935); GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS 227
(3d ed. 1949); RESTATEMIENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS, Introductory Not, c. '12 '(1934).
The Restatement includes under procedure all matters making the application of the
foreign law "impracticable, inconvenient, or violative of local policy." See Morgan,
Choice of Law Governing Proof, 58 HARV. L. Rv. 153, 156 (1944) for a critical analysis
of the rule as thus states.
4. 3 BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 586.1-591.1 (1935) ; GOODRiCHf, CONFLICT OF LAWS
§ 82 (3d ed. 1949); RESTATEmENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 586-91 (1934). For an ex-
cellent analysis of the law governing function of judge and jury, see Morgan, Choice of
Law Governing Proof, 58 HARV. L. Rzv. 153 (1944).
5. E.g., Central Vermont Ry. v. White, 238 U.S. 507, 35 Sup. Ct. 865, 59 L. Ed.
1433 (1915) ; Broderick v. McGuire, 119 Conn. 83, 174 Atl. 314, 94 A.L.R. 890 (1934) ;
Shepard & Gluck v. Thomas, 147 Tenn. 338, 246 S.W. 836 (1922) ; Bain v. Whitehaven
& Furness Junction Ry., 3 H.L. Cas. 1, 10 Eng. Rep. 1 (1850) ; 3 BEALE, CONFLICT OF
LAWS § 597.1 (1935).
6. E.g., Jones v. Chicago, St. P., M. & 0. Ry., 80 Minn. 488, 83 N.W. 446, 49 L.R.A.
640 (1900) ; Shepard & Gluck v. Thomas, 147 Tenn. 338, 246 S.W. 836, 839 (1922); 3
BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 596.1 (1935).
7. E.g., Scudder v. Union National Bank, 91 U.S. 406, 23 I' Ed. 245 (1875);
Sirgany v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc., 173 S.C. 120, 175 S.E. 209 (1934); 3 BEALE,
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 597.1 (1935) ; STU,1BERG, CONFLICT OF LAWS 142 (2d ed. 1951).
RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 597, comment a (1934) suggests a situation in which
the lex loci should control.
8. See Sims v. Sims, 75 N.Y. 466 (1878) in which a New York statute declaring
incompetent as a witness a person convicted of a felony was held not applicable where
the conviction was in another state.
Should the law of the forum apply as to privileged communications? An effective
argument can be made that the law of the place where the communication was made
should govern. The reason for giving the privilege is to encourage freedom of com-
munication between the parties involved without fear of disclosure. The 9tate with the
greatest interest in this regard is the state where the communication takes place, rather
than a state where a suit is later brought.
9. E.g., Interstate Life & Accident Co. v. Pannell, 169 Miss. 50, 152 So. 635 (1934);
Inter State Motor Freight Co. v. Johnson, 32 Ohio App. 363, 168 N.E. 143 (1929). See
3 BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 595.2 (1935) ; GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS 238 (3d ed.
1949) ; STUMBERG, CONFLICT OF LAWS 138 (2d ed. 1951).
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There is some disagreement regarding normal presumptions and burden
of proof, but a decided majority of the courts follow the rule that they are
governed by the lea fori.10 Usually, these courts first classify these matters
as procedural and then apply the traditional rule of substance and procedure1 1
But there is on the part of some courts a definite, and perhaps growing,
inclination to look behind the traditional terminology and inquire as to the
nature and effect of the rule of the locus.1 2 A few courts have ruled that
such questions, when they affect the very existence of the right, are them-
selves substantive. 13  Thus it has been held that a comparative negligence
statute of the locus is a matter of substance and should prevail over the
rule of the forum which placed the burden of proving due care on the
the plaintiff.14 A provision of the Workmen's Compensation Act of the locus,
in cases of a nonaccepting employer, creating a presumption of negligence
and probable cause of the employee's injury and requiring the employer to
rebut the presumption to escape liability, was held by the Utah court to be
substantive and therefore controlling.' 5 Another court followed the lex loci,
which held that acceptance by the shipper of a contract limiting the carrier's
liability did not give rise to a presumption of assent, and that the carrier must
present other evidence to show such assent, although its own rule was to the
contrary.'( The New Hampshire court, while recognizing that burden of
10. Helton v. Alabama Midland Ry., 97 Ala. 275, 12 So. 276 (1893) ; In re Winder's
Estate, 98 Cal. App.2d 78, 219 P.2d 18 (1950) ; Hamilton v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.,
71 Ga. App. 784, 32 S.E.2d 540 (1944) ; Kingery v. Donnell, 222 Iowa 241, 268 N.W.
617 (1936) ; Gregory v. Maine Central R.R., 317 Mass. 636, 59 N.E.2d 471, 159 A.L.R.
714 (1945) ; Smith v. Brown, 302 Mass. 432, 19 N.E.2d 732 (1939) ; Levy v. Steiger, 233
Mass. 600, 124 N.E. 477 (1919) ; Clark v. Harnischfeger Sales Corp., 238 App. Div. 493,
264 N.Y. Supp. 873 (2d Dep't 1933) ; Wright v. Palmison, 237 App. Div. 22, 260 N.Y.
Supp. 812 (2d Dep't 1932); Collins v. McClure, 63 Ohio App. 312, 26 N.E.2d 780
(1939) ; Carroll v. Godding, 155 Pa. Super. 490, 38 A.2d 720 (1944); Richardson v.
Pacific Power & Light Co., 11 Wash. 2d 288, 118 P.2d 985 (1941).
11. E.g., Helton v. Alabama Midland Ry., 97 Ala. 275, 12 So. 276 (1893); In re
Winder's Estate, 98 Cal. App. 2d 78, 219 P.2d 18 (1950); Hamilton v. Metropolitan
LifeIns. Co., 71 Ga. App. 784, 32 S.E.2d 540 (1944) ; Levy v. Steiger, 233 Mass. 600,
124 N.E. 477 (1919) ; Clark v. Harnischfeger Sales Corp., 238 App. Div. 493, 264 N.Y.
Supp. 873 (2d Dep't 1933) ; Richardson v. Pacific Power & Light Co., 11 Wash.2d 288,
118 P.2d 985 (1941). But note the language in Helton v. Alabama Midland Ry., supra,
where the court recognizes that some matters of procedure "so attach to the act or
contract as to become a part of the right or obligation itself." 12 So. at 285.
12. Hiatt v. St. Louis-S.F. Ry., 308 Mo. 77, 271 S.W. 806 (1925); Hartmann v.
Louisville & Nashville R.R., 39 Mo. App. 88 (1890) ; Precourt v. Driscoll, 85 N.H. 280,
157 Atl. 525, 78 A.L.R. 874 (1931) ; Fitzpatrick v. International Ry., 252 N.Y. 127, 169
N.E. 112, 68 A.L.R. 801 (1929) ; Buhler v. Maddison, 109 Utah 267, 176 P.2d 118, 168
A.L.R. 177 (1947).
13. E.g., Hiatt v. St. Louis-S.F. Ry., 308 Mo. 77, 271 S.W. 806 (1925) ; Hartmann
v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. 39 Mo. App. 88 (1890) ; Fitzpatrick v. International Ry.,
252 N.Y. 127, 169 N.E. 112, 68 A.L.R. 801 (1929) ; Buhler v. Maddison, 109 Utah 267,
176 P.2d 118, 168 A.L.R. 177 (1947); 11 Am. JuR., Conflict of Laws § 203 (1937).
See Helton v. Alabama Midland Ry., 97 Ala. 275. 12 So. 276, 285 (1893).
14. Fitzpatrick v. International Ry., 252 N.Y. 127, 169 N.E. 112, 68 A.L.R. 801
(1929).
15. Buhler v. Maddison, 109 Utah 267, 176 P.2d 118, 168 A.L.R. 177 (1947).
16. Hartmann v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 39 Mo. App. 88 (1890).
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proof and presumptions relate to the remedy, held the rule of the locus
applicable for the reason that the foreign remedy was so inseparable from
the cause of action that it should be enforced to preserve the integrity and
character of the substantive right 17
Although the cases on the precise point are few, the applicability of the
rule of res ipsa loquitur is generally regarded as a matter of procedure to be
determined by the law of the forum,I s which seems entirely proper when the
effect of the doctrine is that the jury may draw an inference of negligence,
but is not required to draw it. But where the doctrine is held to create a pre-
sumption of negligence, whether or not it shifts the burden of persuasion to
the defendant, there is authority for treating it as a matter of substance since
in such case it is so closely related to the right.' 9 Under this view it would
have been appropriate in the instant case to determine the nature of the res
ipsa rule in Indiana.
One of the paramount ends of a system of conflict of laws is to assure
that the result of litigation shall not be different because of the forum in
which the suit is brought.2 0 While the rule that the lex for governs matters
of procedure is grounded on valid reasons of practical convenience and public
policy, it should be recognized that its mechanical application often produces
results inconsistent with this fundamental purpose.2 ' Where questions of
17. Precourt v. Driscoll, 85 N.H. 280, 157 Atl. 525, 78 A.L.R. 874 (1931), 16 MINN.
L. REv. 586 (1932), 80 U. OF PA. L. REV. 911 (1932).
In cases arising under the Federal Employers' Liability Act and in admiralty cases,
the burden of proof is on the defendant, even where the state court follows the opposite
rule. Central Vermont Ry. v. White, 238 U.S. 507, 35 Sup. Ct. 865, 59 L. Ed. 1433 (1915) ;
Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., 317 U.S. 239, 63 Sup. Ct. 246, 87 L. Ed. 239 (1942) ;
Intagliata v. Shipowners & Merchants Towboat Corp., 26 Cal.2d 365, 159 P.2d 1 (1945).
In diversity of citizenship cases, the federal courts hold burden of proof to be governed
by the rule of the state in which they are sitting, finding uniformity of result between
federal and state courts more desirable than uniformity between the locus and the
forum. Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109, 63 Sup. Ct. 477, 87 L. Ed. 645 (1943) ; Sampson
v. Channell, 110 F2d 754 (1st Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 650, 60 Sup. Ct. 1099,
84 L. Ed. 1415 (1940); Note, 26 WASH. U.L.O. 244 (1941). The Supreme Court has
abandoned the dichotomy of substance and procedure in deciding the applicable law
in diversity cases. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 65 Sup. Ct. 1464, 89 L. Ed.
2079 (1945) (statute of limitations of state of forum held applicable); Ragan v.
Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530, 69 Sup. Ct. 1233, 93 L. Ed. 1520
(1949) (holding state law determines when suit was commenced); Woods v. Interstate
Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535, 69 Sup. Ct. 1235, 93 L. Ed. 1524 (1949); Cohen v. Beneficial
Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 69 Sup. Ct. 1221, 93 L. Ed. 1528 (1949).
18. In addition to the instant case, see Clodfelter v. Wells, 212 N.C. 823, 195 S.E. 11
(1938) ; see Morgan, Choice of Law Governing Proof, 58 Hav. L. REv. 153, 177 (1944).
Accord, Sierocinski v. E. I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 118 F.2d 531 (3d Cir. 1941).
19. See Lachman v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, Inc., 160 F.2d 496 (4th Cir.
1947); Smith v. Pennsylvania Central Airlines Corp., 76 F. Supp. 940, 6 A.L.R.2d 521
(D.D.C. 1948).
20. 3 BEALE, CorLIcT OF LAWS § 584.1 (1935) ; RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAws,
Introductory Note, Ch. 12 (1934).
21. See Precourt v. Driscoll, 85 N.H. 280, 157 Atl. 525, 78 A.L.R. 874 (1931), 16
MINN. L. REv. 586 (1932), 80 U. OF PA. L. REv. 911 (1932) ; CooK, THE LoGIA.. AND
LEGAL BASES OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 163-67 (1942).
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presumptions and burden of proof closely affect the outcome of litigation, its
application is justifiable only when the burden of resorting to the lex loci is so
great as to be impracticable, or when public policy of the forum is violated.
The exception to the general rule appears based on sound reasoning and is
entirely consonant with the basic philosophy of conflict of laws.
EVIDENCE-DUE PROCESS-USE IN STATE PROSECUTION OF
EVIDENCE FORCIBLY OBTAINED BY STOMACH PUMP
Three sheriffs, suspecting defendant of selling narcotics, entered his
room without a warrant, and upon seeing two capsules on a table inquired
of their nature. Defendant thrust these capsules in his mouth and a vain
struggle to obtain the pills from his mouth enused. He was then taken to
a hospital where, at the direction of the officers, the capsules were forced from
him by the use of a stomach pump. The pills, containing morphine, were
admitted in evidence over the objection of defendant and on appeal the
state supreme court held the illegally obtained evidence admissible. The
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari. Held, reversed. The con-
duct of the officers in obtaining the evidence violated due process of law,
offending the canons of decency and fair play. Rochin v. California, 72 Sup.
Ct. 205 (1952).
In federal prosecutions any evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth
and Fifth Amendments (unreasonable search and seizure, self-incrimination)
is inadmissible.' On the other hand, these amendments are not imposed on
the states by the Fourteenth Amendment.2 The Supreme Court consistently
refuses to apply the federal exclusionary rule to state procedure,3 and it is
even held that evidence improperly obtained by state officers is admissible
1. Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28, 47 Sup. Ct. 248, 71 L. Ed. 520 (1926);
Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 46 Sup. Ct. 4, 70 L. Ed. 145 (1925); Gouled
v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 41 Sup. Ct. 261, 65 L. Ed. 647 (1921); Weeks v.
United States, 232 U.S. 383, 34 Sup. Ct. 341, 58 L. Ed. 652 (1914) (papers taken
from room of defendant by a United States marshal). But cf. Olmstead v. United
States, 277 U.S. 438, 48 Sup. Ct. 564, 72 L. Ed. 944 (1928) (wire tapping held not
to violate Fifth Amendment).
2. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 69 Sup. Ct. 1359, 93 L. Ed. 1782 (1949) (ad-
missibility of illegally obtained evidence) ; Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 67 Sup.
Ct. 1672, 91 L. Ed. 1903 (1947) (privilege against self-incrimination not vital to a fair
trial) ; Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 58 Sup. Ct. 149, 82 L. Ed. 288 (1937)
(double jeopardy) ; Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 29 Sup. Ct. 14, 53 L. Ed. 97
(1908) (privilege against self-incrimination).
3. See note 2, supra. Twenty-nine states have refused to adopt the federal ex-
clusionary rule; 17 have adopted it. See, e.g., McIntyre v. State, 190 Ga. 872, 11
S.E.2d 5 (1940); State v. Alexander, 83 A.2d 441 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1951); State v.
Cram, 176 Ore. 577, 160 P.2d 283 (1945). Contra: Rickards v. State, 77 A.2d 199, 205
(Del. 1950) ; Apodaca v. State, 140 Tex. Cr. 493, 146 S.W.2d 381 (1941).
RECENT CASES
in' a fedbral' proceeding.- The view of the Supreme Court is that the states
should be allowed in most cases to determine their own procedural rules on
obtaining-evidence. Although criticized by a minority of the Court as failing
adequately to protect the accused, 5 this view was recently reaffirmed by Wolf
v. ColoradoG and is reiterated in the instant case.
7
Instead of the federal exclusionary rule the Supreme Court applies to
state law enforcement the less restrictive test of due process. The illegal
conduct must violate "a principle so rooted in the conscience of our people as
to be ranked fundamental."" It is in connection with the admission of con-
fessions that this test has been most widely applied, beginning with Brown v.
Mississippi,9 a clear case of torture where the confession was obtained by
brutal beating. The' Supreme Court in reversing the state court there held
that this evidence was inadmissible as a violation of due process but that
the "privilege against self-incrimination was not involved."' 0 This reasoning
lifs been gradually extended to conduct other than physical coercion. 1  For
bxample, 36 continuous hours of questioning,12 early 'morning interrogation
plus a denial of counsel,18 and periodic questioning in five- and six-hour
sessions' 4 have all been held violations of due process. These situations in-
volve a degree of coercion that could affect the truthworthiness of the state-
ments. The Court through a series of many cases has to some extent filled
out the law on confessions, indicating what conduct will render them inad-
missible regardless of their corroboration. 15
4. See, e.g., Feldman v. United States, 322 U.S. 487, 64 Sup. Ct. 1082, 88 L. Ed.
1408 (1944); Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 41 Sup. Ct. 574, 65 L. Ed. 1048
(1921).
5. A minority of the Court have consistently dissented in recent years. The strongest
and most complete statement of the viewpoint that the Fourteenth Amendment in-
corporates all the provisions of the first eight is in Mr. Justice Black's famous dissent
in Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 68, 67 Sup. Ct. 1672, 91 L. Ed. 1903 (1947). See
the answer to this, in Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate The Bill
of Rights? 2 STAN. L. REV. 5 (1949). See, in general, Curtis, A Modern Supreme Court
in a Modern World, 4 VAND. L. REv. 427 (1951) ; Farrelly, Searches and Seizures
During the Triuman Era, 25 So. CALiF. L. REv. 1 (1951) ; Frank, The United States
Supreme Court: 1948-49, 17 U. oF CHI. L. REV. (1949) ; Green, The Bill of Rights,
The Fourteenth Amendment and The Supreme Court, 46 MicH. L. REv. 869 (1948).
6. 338 U.S. 25, 39 Sup. Ct. 1359, 93 L. Ed. 1782 (1949).
7. 72 Sup. Ct. at 207, 212 (Black and Douglas, JJ., concurring).
8. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325, 58 Sup. Ct. 149, 82 L. Ed. 288 (1937).
9. 297 U.S. 278, 56 Sup. Ct. 461, 80 L. Ed. 682 (1936).
10. Id. at 285.
11. See Sanders, Criminal Law Administration Prior to Trial: Recent Developments,
4 VAND. L. REv. 781-86 (1951).
12. Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 64 Sup. Ct. 921, 88 L. Ed. 1192 (1944).
But cf. Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 62 Sup. Ct. 280, 86 L. Ed. 166 (1941).
13. Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 68 Sup. Ct. 302, 92 L. Ed. 224 (1948) (accused
was questioned five hours early in the morning and later held incommunicado).
14. Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 69 Sup. Ct. 1347, 93 L. Ed. 1801 (1949).
15. See Wicker, Some Developments in the Law Concerning Confessions, supra p. 507.
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In the instant case the court is confronted with a situation where the
method of obtaining evidence is by illegal search and seizure of physical
objects, and where the evidence is not testimonial as in confessions. This
case is the first to hold this type of evidence inadmissible under the due
process test.' 6  In determining what state-police conduct will invalidate the
illegally obtained evidence, the court first reiterates the principle of fair play
and decency embodied in due process, then sets for itself the two-fold func-
tion of deciding what at the moment constitutes fair play and whether the
police violated it. In establishing these standards the court indicates that
the conduct would offend even the most hardened sensibilities. The combina-
tion of relevant events here is illegally breaking in on the privacy of the
accused, the use of force in trying to open his mouth and the use of the
stomach pump. The stomach pumping, conduct almost equal to torture,
seems the vital factor. It is what would cause pain to anyone, not just to the
fastidious. There apparently must be conduct that is degrading in itself,
forcing a person to submit to humiliating, extremely embarrassing treatment,
that would be such regardless of its accusatory aspect or its relevance.
How the principle of the instant case will apply to other types of physical
evidence obtained by some element of coercion or illegal search and seizure
remains to be seen. Rulings of 'state courts will not be in point on the due
process issue, but they may at least suggest some of the factual problems
which will arise. Being compelled to remove a visor,17 place one's foot in
a print, 8 or put on a bullet-riddled shirt' 9 clearly does not involve any ele-
ment of torture under the above-described standard. The taking of blood "
or urine2' samples probably would not affect the average person in any way
comparable to stomach pumping, nor would removing an object from the
accused's mouth.22 A physical examination of a woman for venereal disease2a
and the use of an enema to regain rings swallowed by the accused24 are closer
to the facts of the instant case.
25
16. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 69 Sup. Ct. 1359, 93 L. Ed. 1082 (1949), though
holding the privilege against illegal search and seizure to be a part of due process stated
that a violation of this privilege by state officers did not render the evidence inadmissible
in a state court.
17. As in People v. Clark, 18 Cal.2d 449, 116 P.2d 56 (1941) (admissible in state
court).
18. As in State v. Oschou, 49 Nev. 194, 242 Pac. 582 (1926).
19. As in State v. Graham, 74 N.C. 646 (1876) ; State v. Smith, 133 S.C. 291, 130
S.E. 884 (1925) (admissible in state court).
20. As in State v. Cram, 176 Ore. 577, 160 P.2d 283 (1945) (admissible).
21. As in State v. Duguid, 50 Ariz. 276, 72 P.2d 435 (1937) (admissible).
22. As in United States v. Ong Sin Hong, 36 P.I. 735 (1917) (admissible).
23. McManus v. Commonwealth, 264 Ky. 240, 94 S.W.2d 609 (1936) (inadmissible).
Contra: United States v. Tan Teng, 23 P.I. 145 (1912) (admissible).
24. As in Ash v. State, 139 Tex. Cr. 420, 141 S.W.2d, 341 (1940) (admissible).




When Brown v. Mississippi was decided the application of due process
to confessions was unsettled and indefinite. That case involved an obvious
instance of torture; since then less obvious conduct has been held to violate
due process as the Court by a gradual development established a dearer,
more restrictive standard. It will be interesting to observe whether by the
same empiric process there will develop a broader exclusionary standard in
the type of situation involved in the instant case.
EVIDENCE-ENTRIES IN THE REGULAR COURSE OF BUSINESS-
TEST FOR EXTENT OF ADMISSIBILITY UNDER FEDERAL
JUDICIAL CODE
Plaintiff, a ticket collector for defendant railroad, through the negligence
of defendant was injured in the course of his employment, and brought this
action under the Federal Employers' Liability Act. He was treated by the
company doctor and by two specialists to whom he was sent by the company
doctor. The trial court, over the objection of defendant, allowed the intro-
duction in evidence of copies of letters from the specialists to the railroad claim
department and the company physician, the letters to the company having been
"furnished" to plaintiff from defendant's files. Although offered an oppor-
tunity to subpoena the specialists, defendant was content to stand on its formal
objection that the letters were purely hearsay and not reports made in the
regular course of its business and now appeals from the judgment for plaintiff.
Held (2-1),' affirmed. The letters were admissible as entries in the regular
course of the doctors' business. Korte v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 191 F.2d
86 (2d Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 868 (1951).
The strict common law exception to the hearsay rule under which business
entries are admissible includes (1) the shop book doctrine,2 which grew up to
allow the plaintiff, incompetent as a witness and without a clerk, to prove claims
in a restricted field of business transactions by his account book ;* and (2) the
rule involving entries in the regular course of business,4 which makes admissible
writings made in the regular course of business by a person dead at the time
*This Recent Case has appeared in an issue published by the University of Florida
Law Review, composed of contributions by the member reviews of the Southern Law
Review Conference.
1. Majority opinion by Clark, J. (Frank, J., concurring); dissenting opinion by
Chase, J.
2. 5 WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE §§ 1517-18, 1536-44 (3d ed. 1940); MoRGAN et al., THE LAw
or EvrDENcE 51 (1927).
3. When parties became competent as witnesses, this part of the exception was
rendered anachronistic, but it still survives, though more in name than in spirit.
4. 5 Wi Gom, EVIDENCE §§ 1521-33; MORGAN et al., THE LAw OF EVIDENCE 51 (1927).
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of trial.5 The utility of the "regular entry" branch of the exception has been
seriously curtailed by technicalities0 and two types of statutes have been
evolved to abolish the unnecessary common law restrictions-vi., the Uniform
Business Records as Evidence Act (the Uniform Act)
8 and statutes based on
The Commonwealth Fund Committee report 9 and embodied in the American
'Law Institute Model Code of 'Evidence (the Model Act).10 The'Model Act,
substantially adopted for the federal courts,' makes trustworthihesg df an
otherwise qualified entry a question for the jury, whereas the Uniform Act
requires the judge to consider both the sources of information and the circum-
stances of making before allowing reception of the entry.
12
Apparently fearful of the liberalizing tendency of these acts, some courts
have continued to circumscribe admissibility of business entries.13 They have
5. A third subdivision of the exception is employed to alldi the use of memoranda
made in, the course of business by an available witness who has no adequate recollection
of the matter. Jackson v. Pioneer Adhesive Works, Inc., 132 N.J.L. 397, 40 A.2d 634
(1945); Morgan, The Law of Evidentce, 1941-1945, 59 HARv. L. REv. 481 (1946).
6. 5 WIG-ORE, EVIDENCE §§ 1521-33; VANDERBILT, MI I' MUM STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL
AbmiNiSTRATION 348 (1949).
7. The English statute, Evidence Act, 1938, 1 & 2 GEo. 6, c. 28, which admits recdidg
made in the performance of a duty to record, whether or not the entrant has personal
knowledge of the facts, is entirely different in scope from the narrower American business
entry statutes. It is phrased to admit all documentary statements, though the declarant
is available as a witness, unless the statement was "made by a person, iterested at a
time when proceedings were pending or anticipated involving a dispute ds to any 'fact
which the statement might tend to establish.' See Jarman v. Lambert and Cooke
(Contractors), Ltd., [1951] 2 K.B. 937, [1951] 2 All E.R. 255 (C.A.) Carter, Evidence
Act, 1938: Problems of lIntcrpretation, 68. L'.Q'. R.v. 106 (1952). See note 14, in ra.
8. "A record of an act, condition or event shall . . " be competent evidence if the
custodian or other qualified witness testifies to its identity and the mode of its preparation,
and if it was made in the regular course of business, at or near the time of the act ...
and if, in the opinion of the court, the sources of information, method and time of prepara-
tion were such as to justify its admission." 9 U.L.A. 387 (1951) ; VANDERBILT, oU. eit.
supra note 5, at 348.
9. MOhGAN- et al., THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 51 (1927).
10. MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE, Rule 514 (1942). The history and scope of the
statutes are fully discussed in Note, 11 BROOKLYN L. REV. 78 (1941). .
11. 62 STAT. 945 (1948), as amended, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1732(a) (Supp. 1951). "[A]ny
writing or record, . . . made as a memorandum or record of any act, transaction, occur-
rence, or event, shall be admissible as evidence of such . . .if. made in regular course of
any business, and if it was the regular course of such business to make such memorandum
or record at the time of such act . . .or within a reasonable time thereafter. All other
circumstances of the making ... including lack of personal knowledge by the entrant or
maker, may ... affect its weight, but ... shall not affect its admissibility."
12. In Stella Cheese Co. v. Chicago, St.P., M. & 0. Ry., 248 Wis. 196, 21 N.W.2d
655, 657 (1946), the court describes qualifications of the federal statute by saying "The
statutory conditions being fulfilled . ..the question of untrustworthiness would have to
be advanced affirmatively by [the party objecting]." See Notes, 48 COL. L. REV. 920
(1948), 46 MICH. L. REv. 802 (1948).
13. Contrast discussions of legislative history of the federal statute in Palmer v.
Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109, 63 Sup. Ct. 477, 87 L. Ed. 645, 144 A.L.R. 719 (1943) and New
York Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 147 F.2d 297 (D.C. Cir. 1944-1945), with the interpretation
of the statute by Judge Wyzanski in United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 89
F. Supp. 349, 354 (D. Mass. 1950). See Note, 46 MICH. L. REV. 802:(1948) for types
of entries affected by, the statutes.
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been timorous when confronted with such chimeras as hearsay on hearsay"'
and inclusion of extraneous matter in the record.'I The Supreme Court, in
Palmer v. Hoffman,1 held that a written statement of an unavailable eye-wit-
ness railroad employee made during the course of an accident investigation by
the company was inadmissible because not made in the regular course of busi-
ness. The Court thought that admission of'entries only partially related to the
,business, but made in the regular course of conduct, was not justified by the
statute; lT if such entries were admissible, regularity of preparation would
become the test without regard to "earmarks of .reliability . .'. acquir ed
from their source... and the nature of their compilation.""' In this it gave some
support to the opinion of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, which
had rejected the report as "dripping with self interest."' 9 Later, on the ground
that the Palmer case confined admissible entries'to those which are trustworthy
because they represent routine reflections of day to day operations,20 the
14. Fuller v. White, 33 Cal.2d 236, 201 P.2d 16 (1949) (letter from insurance agent
quoting dcedent's statement as to reason why policy was originally taken out held
inadmissible as double hearsay although identified as a business record, court implying
that the original application might have been admissible because it was contemporaneous),;
Kelly v. Ford Motor Co., 280 Mich. 378, 273 N.W. 737 (1937) (in workmen's compensa-
tion case the only evidence of cause of injury, decedent's statement on company hospital
record, held inadmissible as double hearsay). But cf. Jarman v. Lambert and Cooke
(Contractors), Ltd., [1951] 2 K.B. 937, [1951] 2 All E.,R. 255 (C.A.) (statement by
deceased as to cause of otherwise unwitnessed injury in application for workmen's -compen-
sation admitted as evidence in common law action of negligence instituted by his widow,
court construing the Evidence Act, 1938, broadly to admit documentary evidence byr
deceased who was undoubtedly interested but did not "anticipate" litigation in the dis-
qualifying sense of the statute).
15. Green v. City of Cleveland, 150 Ohio St. 441, 83 N.E.2d 63 (1948) (hospital
record offered by defendant to contradict plaintiff's position at trial not admissible as a
regular entry since it pertained to the cause of the accident as well as to medical treat-
ment); Flemming v. Thorson, 231 Minn. 343, 43 N.W.2d 225 (1950) (notation "Hold
for Police" on hospital record rendered the record inadmissible as not relating to hospital
business, since the record was offered only as tending to show plaintiff's contributory
negligence). But cf. Watts v. Delaware Coach Co.. 44 Del. 283. 58 A.2d 689 (Del. 1948).;
Freedman v. Mutual Life Insurance Co., 342 Pa. 404, 21 A.2d 81, 135 A.L.R, 1249 (1941).
16. 318 U.S. 109, 63 Sup. Ct. 477, 87 L. Ed. 645, 144 A.L.R. 719 (1943).
17. Followed in Clainos v. United States, 163 F.2d 593 (D.C. Cir. 1947) (police
notations of convictions on back of accused's file picture not within statutory exception
because, while the record was kept in the regular course of business, the events described
were outside the business); Gaynor v. Atlantic Greyhound Corp., 86 F. Supp. 284 (E.D.
Pa. 1949), rev'd on other grounds, 183 F.2d 482 (3d Cir. 1950) (WSA record of physical
examination held not a report made for the systematic conduct of the business of war
shipping).
18. 316 U.S. at 114.
19. Hoffman v. Palmer, 129 F.2d 976 (2d Cir. 1942), criticized in Note, 56 HARV.
L. REv. 458 (1942). Presence or absence of motive to misrepresent was the controlling
factor in the admissibility of entries in United States v. Moran, 151 F.2d 661, 167 A.L.R.
403 (2d Cir. 1945) (no motive to falsify telephone memorandum) ; Buckminster's Estate
v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 17 F.2d 331 (2d Cir. 1944) (no motive, to mis-
represent in hospital records, refusing to follow New York Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 147
F.2d 297 (D.C. Cir. 1944); United States v. Northwest Airlines, 69 F. Supp. 482
(D. Minn. 1946) (memorandum made when there was no reason to believe it would be
used in litigation). But cf. Ulm v. Moore-McCormack Lines, 115 F.2d 492 (2d Cir.
1940), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 567 (1941). See Hardman, Hearsay "Self-Serving" Declara-
tions, 52 W. VA. L.Q. 81 (1950).
20. 318 U.S. at 114.
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majority of another court of appeals 2 ' rejected hospital records concerning con-
dition, including psychiatric diagnosis, and treatment of a patient, though
made in the regular course of conduct of the hospital.22  This court argued
that otherwise the act would make all records admissible; the dissent replied
that it might as well be contented that the Palmer doctrine would exclude all
records which are ultimately intended for external use.
On the other hand, the Court's language in the Palmer case gave the Second
Circuit an opportunity in Pekelis v. Transcontinental & Western Air2 to con-
clude that the Supreme Court was aiming at the evils of introducing evidence
built up to support the self interest of the entrant,24 and that its doctrine would
not be applicable to reports which were against the interest of the entrant when
made.25  In Masterson v. Pennsylvania R.R.,26 the Third Circuit held that
admission of letters similar to those in the instant case was error, though harm-
less. Basic identification requirements apparently were not met in the Masterson
case.27 The opinion, however, pointed out the instant court's method for
escaping from the shackles of the Palmer doctrine by indicating that if the
original letters had been identified as having been written by the doctors or
under their direction, as a normal part of professional routine, they might fall
within the statutory exception.
In the principal case, physicians' reports made to the railroad were held to
be entries in the regular course of their business28 and admissible under a
21. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 147 F.2d 297 (D.C. Cir. 1944).
22. The majority argued that to admit opinion in the entry was to deprive the
opponent of the right to cross-examine, id. at 306; the dissent points out that this is true
of all exceptions to the hearsay rule, id. at 309. See Morgan, The Law of Evidence,
1941-1945, 59 HAxv. L. Rv. 481, 564 (1946) for a review of this opinion. Contra:
Moran v. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Co., 183 F.2d 467 (3d Cir. 1950) (admitting
conclusions of experts in Bureau of Mines report) ; Buckminster's Estate v. Commissioner,
147 F.2d 331 (2d Cir. 1944).
23. 187 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1951).
24. In Slifka v. Johnson, 161 F.2d 467 (2d Cir. 1947), letters of an agent were
admitted against the estate both as vicarious admissions and also as entries under the
regular entry statute. The concurring opinion insists that this is not a repudiation of
Palner v. Hoffman because the letters were against the interest of the estate, while in
the Painer case "the alleged 'course of business' was such as obviously to make for
(not against) untrustworthiness." Id. at 469.
25. Accident investigation reports made by boards set up by the company indicated
negligence by defendant's servants and obviously would not be relied on by defendant in
litigation. But the language of the Pekelis opinion would exclude from the Painer
doctrine accident investigation reports made under regulations applicable to conducting
the business. The authority of the Pekelis case, however, is somewhat weakened by the
fact that the business entry was admitted primarily as an adopted admission.
26. 182 F.2d 793 (3d Cir. 1950).
27. The court found that the letters were not routine records, but were written as
aids in resolving a controversy about legal responsibility. They were not confined to a
record of objective acts or conditions. Accord, Gilbert v. Gulf Oil Corp,, 175 F.2d 705
(4th Cir. 1949) ; Gordon v. United States, 164 F.2d 855 (6th Cir. 1947).
28. The court explains that "It is true that no one got on the witness stand to say
that a doctor commissioned to make an examination would make some sort of report of
what he was employed to do .... [I]t is surely implicit in the nature of the transaction
involved... ." 191 F.2d at 90.
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straight interpretation of the statute. But the court went further and also ad-
mitted them under the Pekelis interpretation, saying that the doctors were
acting for the company; and under Pekelis construction, their reports may be
received against the company.29 Thus the reports would be moved into the
category of vicarious admissions if the proponent showed their adoption by
the company.30
Until the Supreme Court recognizes the misapprehension apparent in its
limitation of the statute, other federal courts may well continue to construe
that limitation into harmlessness in order to apply the broad principle of admis-
sibility conceived by the statute.3 '
EVIDENCE-HEARSAY-ADOPTION OF LIBERAL ADMISSION RULES OF
ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS IN ANTITRUST COURT ACTION
In a civil antitrust suit tried without a jury the government offered in
evidence thousands of intracorporate documents and office memoranda taken
from the files of the defendant corporation and not previously revealed to
third parties. The defendant objected to the admission of these papers as
hearsay. Held, the material is admissible. Much of it may be received
under recognized exceptions to the hearsay rule,' but all of the relevant docu-
ments are admissible without the benefit of these exceptions. United States v.
United Shoe Machinery Corp., 89 F. Supp. 349 (D. Mass. 1950).
The hearsay rule, with its technicalities and exceptions, is one of the
most complex and misunderstood of the exclusionary rules of evidence. It
is often said to be a product of the jury system,2 although it is generally
applied in nonjury actions.3 The right of a party to have evidence excluded
29. While a litigant cannot introduce evidence built up to promote self-interest or
contrived litigation, "the Pekelis case is clear authority for the admission of business
entries from these doctors when offered by the plaintiff and not by the entrants or the
company for whom they were-temporarily-acting." 191 F.2d at 90.
30. See United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 89 F. Supp. 349, 352 (D. Mass.
1950) ; Morgan, The Rationale of Vicarious Admissions, 42 HARv. L. REV. 461 (1929).
pointing out that when the agent merely transmits information to his superior, his report
cannot be viewed as if the superior were speaking.
31. See dissent by Clark, J., in Hoffman v. Palmer, 129 F.2d 976, 998-1002 (2d Cir.
1942).
1. Where it could be shown that the corporation based its conduct upon these
documents, they may be received as extra-judicial admissions. See 4 WIGmoRE, EVIDENCE
§§ 1048, 1073 (3d ed. 1940). Many of the papers came within the business entry
statute. 62 STAT. 945 (1948), 28 U.S.C.A. § 1732 (1950). See 5 rIGMORE, EVIDENCE
§ 1520 (3d ed. 1940)) ; Ginsburg, The Admissibility of Business Records in Evidence,
29 NEB. L. REv. 60 (1949).
2. Morgan and Maguire, Looking Backward and Forward at Evidence, 50 HARV.
L. REV. 909, 918 (1937).
3. McCormick, Tonzorrow's Law of Evidence, 24 A.B.A.J. 507, 508 (1938).
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as hearsay has been attributed to several factors, among which are: (1) the
declarant is not under oath; (2) the declarant is not subject to cross-examina-
tion; and (3) the jury is incapable of properly evaluating testimony of this
nature.4  Most of the commentators have recommended limitations on the
use of the hearsay rule,5 and the ever-increasing importance of administrative
tribunals with their comparatively informal rules of procedure by which all
relevant evidence is generally admitted has made clearer the obstructions to
intelligent investigation which the application of this rule produces.6
This suit could have been entertained by the Federal Trade Commission.
7
The court, with a clear realization of the significance of its action, has rejected
the old rule by admitting hearsay of intrinsic trustworthiness over the ob-
jections of the defendant. Several reasons are given by the court for the
decision. In an antitrust suit no penalty is imposed on the defendant such
as the duty to pay damages; only the future conduct of the corporation is
affected.8 The reception of hearsay in a case tried without a jury is rarely
reversible error; in the absence of a showing to the contrary, the appellate
courts assume that the trial judge has sifted the evidence offered and in
reaching a decision has considered only that which could have been admitted
in the trial under the exclusionary rules.9 Moreover, the Federal Trade
4. MORGAN AND MAGUIRE, CASES AND MATERIALS ON EVIDENCE 502-04 (3d cd.
(1951).
5. See, e.g., Green, Evidence and the Federal Rules, 55 HARv. L. REV. 197, 225
(1941) ; Maguire, Heresy About Hearsay, 8 U. oF CHI. L. Ry. 621 (1941) ; McCormick,
Tomorrow's Law of Evidence, 24 A.B.A.J. 507, 580 (1938) ; Morgan, Hearsay Dangers
and the Application of the Hearsay Concept, 62 HARv. L. REV. 177, 219 (1948).
6. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW §§ 141 et seq. (1951); Davis, Evidence Reform:
The Administrative Process Leads the Way, 34 MINN. L. REV. 581 (1950). Most
administrative tribunals are not restricted to the rules of evidence used in jury trials.
See Vanderbilt, The Technique of Proof Beforie Administrative Bodies, 24 IOWA L. REy.
464 (1939); Wigmore, Administrative Boards and Commissions: Are the Jury-Trial
Rule of Evidence in Force for Their Inquiries? 17 ILL. L. REV. 263 (1922). These
rules must of necessity be flexible. Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidene in the
Administrative Process, 55 -ARv. L. REV. 364 (1941). Generally the tendency is to
admit all relevant evidence which is of the kind on which responsible persons will rely
in serious affairs. DAvIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 140 (1951). "Any oral or documentary
evidence may be received, but every agency shall as a matter of policy provide for the
exclusion of irrelevant, immaterial, or unduly repetitious evidence and no sanction shall
be imposed or rule or order be issued except upon consideration of the whole record or
such portions thereof as may be cited by any party and as supported by and in accord-
ance with the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence." Federal Administrative Pro-
cedure Act § 7(c), 60 STAT. 241 (1946), 5 U.S.C.A. § 1006(c) (1950). For a discussion
of the procedure before various federal commissions and a comparison with procedure in
the courts, see STEPHENS, ADMINISTRATIvE TRIBUNALS AND THE RULES OF EVIDENCE
(1933).
7. Antitrust suits may be brought in the district court by the Department of Justice
or before the Federal Trade Commission on its own initiative. See Federal Trade
Commission v. Cement Institute, 33 U.S. 683, 68 Sup. Ct. 793, 92 L. Ed. 1009 (1948).
8. See, e.g., United States v. Cooper Corp., 312 U.S. 600, 61 Sup. Ct. 742, 85 L. Ed.
1071 (1941).
9. "One who is capable of ruling accurately upon the admissibility of evidence is
equally capable of sifting it accurately after it has been received, and, since he will base
his findings on the evidence which he regards as competent, material and convincing, he
cannot be injured by the presence in the record of testimony which he does not consider
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Commission receives hearsay in these actions, 10 and the court argues that a
judge is as competent as the commission to weigh such evidence.
There are definite advantages resulting from the admission of hearsay
in antitrust actions. It is a tremendous time-saver." Naturally the evi-
dence cannot be admitted sight unseen; examination to determine relevancy
will continue to be necessary to prevent a prolonged trial and an endless
record in case of appeal. However, the judge need no longer hear arguments
and make rulings on the hearsay question itself. Uniformity in decisions
is another probable outcome. Although there are certain differences in
the effects of the decisions of the Federal Trade Commission and of the
district courts,12 the basic result of both is the regulation of future conduct,
and the Government should not be allowed to control the outcome of antitrust
cases to any extent by its selection of a forum.13 Perhaps the most important
advantage attained is the increased opportunity for a decision based on all
of the facts. The antitrust cases are invariably complex.' 4 Corporate poli-
cies and activities are often buried deep within their files. Consequently,
hearsay may be highly relevant and even more enlightening than direct testi-
nony.15
I Judge Wyzanski suggests in his opinion the beliei, prevelant in most
courts today, that restrictive rules of procedure are depriving the courts of
their legitimate business.1' Although there is some feeling that cases of th
type require treatment that only a specialist can give, it is equally important
that big business, as well as other activities regulated by these boards, be
controlled in the light of our over-all social policies. The courts with their
competent or material." Donnelly Garment Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 123
F.2d 215, 224 (8th Cir. 1942). See, e.g., Hedrick v. Perry, 102 F.2d 802, 808 (10th Cir.
1939) ; Kauk v. Anderson, 137 F.2d 331, 334 (8th Cir. 1943) ; Erceg v. Fairbanks Ex-
ploration Co., 95 F.2d 850 (9th Cir. 1938). Reversal is much more likely to result from
the exclusion of evidence which should be admitted. See, e.g., Builders Steel v. Com-
missioner, 179 F.2d 377 (8th Cir. 1950).
10. See, e.g., Federal Trade Commision v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683, 68 Sup.
Ct. 793, 92 L. Ed. 1009 (1949); Phelps Dodge Refining Corp. v. Federal Trade Com-
mission, 139 F.2d 393, 397 (2d Cir. 1943).
11. See McAllister, The Big Case: Procedural Problems in Antitrust- Litigation,
64 HARV. L. Rav. 27, 42 (1950), for a discussion of the time element in the case; 15,000
objections were raised to the admission of the documents. And see PROCEDURE IN ANTI-
TRUST AND OTHER PROTRACTED CASES (Adm. Office of U.S. Courts 1951).
12. See 64 HARv. L. REv. 340 (1950).
13. See note 7 supra.
14. "[I)t is clear that in antitrust litigation the sprawling charges, the elastic rules
of substantive law, the case by case approach and rules of evidence that set no effective
limits to what may be offered and received in court pose a serious problem of judicial
administration." McAllister, The Big Case: Procedural Problems in Antitrust Litigation,
64 HARv. L. REv. 27, 28 (1950).
15. See Morgan, Hearsay Dangers and the Application of the Hearsay Concept,
62 HARv. L. REv. 177, 219 (1948).
16. 89 F.Supp. at 355,
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broader range of experience would appear to be better equipped to handle
such problems.
This decision has not been unanimously approved. It has been sug-
gested that all of the material admitted came within the basic requisites of
an exception to the hearsay rule, trustworthiness and necessity,'7 and that
a new exception would have been a better solution.' 8 However, to add
to the already overwhelming list of exceptions would only serve to further
complicate the rules of evidence.' 9 Furthermore, the courts have been re-
luctant to create new exceptions save where provided for by statute.2 0 Where
there is no jury, all of the relevant evidence not excluded by public policy
should be admitted so long as it is logically probative.
21
What will be the effect of this decision? There are other types of con-
troversies which are triable before both the courts and administrative tri-
bunals; other cases may be tried by a judge without a jury. There seems to
be no logical reason why the admission of hearsay should not be extended to
either or both of these situations. Nor is there any reason why other liberal
evidentiary rules applied by the administrative tribunals should not be
adopted by the courts in these cases. In time this procedure might even
extend to all actions maintained in the courts. This case may well offer a
technique by which the courts may attain a much-needed reform in the rules
of evidence.
EVIDENCE-IMPEACHMENT OF ONE'S OWN WITNESS-USE OF
PRIOR INCONSISTENT STATEMENTS
The state produced a witness to prove defendant had admitted the use
of narcotics. The witness testified that defendant had made no such admission
to her. After laying a proper foundation the state, over defendant's objection,
was allowed to introduce a prior contradictory statement of its witness, and
defendant assigns error thereon. Held, affirmed. The witness unexpectedly
gave testimony against the party who produced her, and that party may in-
17. See Note, 60 YALE L.J. 363, 369 (1951), citing 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 1420-22
(3d ed. 1940).
18. See 25 So. CALIF. L. REv. 139 (1951).
19. See Morgan, The Hearsay Rule, 12 WAsHI. L. REv. 1 (1937), discussing the
rule and its exceptions.
20. See generally on written statements as hearsay, Note, 10 A.L.R.2d 1035 (1950),
for cases upholding the rule.
21. THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE 530 (1898) ; Davis, Evidence
Reform: the Administrative Process Leads the Way, 34 MINN. L. REv. 581 (1950);




troduce her prior contradictory statements for impeachment purposes. People
v. LeBeau, 235 P.2d 850 (Cal. App. 1951).
The origin of the rule against impeaching one's own witness' as well as
any justification for its continued existence defies reasonable analysis.2 Whether
it is derived from the ancient process of compurgation, 3 or from the fact that
permitting a party to present pertinent data to a jury through chosen wit-
nesses was regarded as a matter of favor in the earliest adversary proceedings,
is the subject of dispute among commentators. 4 Yet the doctrine that a party
guarantees the credibility of his witness persists today, although no one sup-
poses that a party has a free choice in the selection of witnesses.5 The basis
given for the rule by some courts is that a party should not be allowed to
coerce his witnesses by threats of impeachment or degradation,6 reasoning
which does not fit the rule. There is little logic in allowing a party to coerce
his opponent's witnesses by threats of degradation while denying him the right
to impeach his own hostile witness, at least by evidence showing mistake in
observation or memory if not by degrading evidence. To enforce this policy
properly, and allow any impeachment of the witness' character, the court
should require both parties to put on evidence impeaching his moral character
before the witness has given material testimony.
A party has never been so far bound by his witness' testimony as to
prevent contradiction by other admissible evidence.7 Courts allow the jury
1. In Tennessee the witness must be interrogated on a material matter to become
examining party's witness. Elliot v. Shultz, 29 Tenn. 234 (1849) (witness belonged to
party examining him, not to party who summoned but did not examine); Young v.
Gregory Bus Line, 1 Tenn. App. 282 (W.S. 1925) (party not bound by testimony of wit-
ness because of having taken deposition before trial). But cf. Story v. Saunders, 27 Tenn.
663 (1848) (neither party taking deposition of witness allowed to impeach). A witness the
party is compelled to, call may be impeached. Alexander v. Beadle, 47 Tenn. 126 (1869)
(subscribing witness to will may be impeached). See CARUTHERS, HISTORY OF A LAWsuIT
§ 356 (7th ed., Gilreath, 1951) ; LEE, TENNESSEE EVIDENCE § 213 (1949).
2. People v. De Martini, 213 N.Y. 203, 107 N.E. 501, 503 L.R.A. 1915F 601
(1914); Ladd, Impeachment of One's Own Witness-New Developments, 4 U. OF CHI.
L. REV. 69 (1936).
3. Crago v. State, 28 Wyo. 215, 202 Pac. 1099 (1922) ; 3 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 896
(3d ed. 1940).
4. MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE 20 (1942) ; MORGAN & MAGUIRE, CASES AND MATERIALS
ON EVIDENCE 244-48 (3d ed. 1951) ; Ladd, supra note 2.
5. People v. Johnson, 314 Ill. 486, 145 N.E. 703 (1924) ; State v. Wolfe, 109 V. Va.
590, 156 S.E. 56 (1930) ; 3 WHARTON, CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 1389 (11th ed. 1935) ; 3
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 898 (3d ed. 1940) ; Note, 9 TENN. L. REv. 207 (1931).
6. People v. Miky, 227 N.Y. 94, 124 N.E. 126, 128 (1919) (enough to fear impeach-
ment from adverse party) ; Cox v. Eayres, 55 Vt. 24, 27 (1883) (citing BULLER, NIsI
PRIUS) ; 3 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 899 (3d ed. 1940).
7. This is the Tennessee rule. Record v. Copperage Co., 108 Tenn. 657, 69 S.W. 334
(1902) (allowed to contradict witness by any admissible testimony) ; Bank of Henderson-
ville v. Dozier, 24 Tenn. App. 178, 142 S.W.2d 191 (M.S. 1940) (could contradict but not
impeach opponent called as your witness). But cf. Hale v. Johnston, 140 Tenn. 182, 203
S.W. 949, 954 (1918) (court failed to recognize admissibility of the evidence). He may
contradict himself if the facts are not peculiarily within his knowledge. Ritchie v. Reo
Sales Corp., 272 Mich. 684, 262 N.W. 321 (1935) (verdict based on plaintiff's other
evidence contrary to his testimony). But cf. Vondrashek v. Dignan, 200 Minn. 530, 274
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to determine creditability and overlook the incidental impeachment. Generally,
today, if a party shows genuine surprise, he may interrogate his own witness
concerning previous inconsistent statements. s Some courts allow the witness to
be so questioned merely as a means of refreshing his recollection, risking in-
cidental impeachment. 9 Others, either by statute or by judicial decision, allow
impeachment by evidence of prior contradictory statements if the court finds
that the proponent is taken by surprise by the testimony of his witness ;1"
though none allow impeachment under ordinary circumstances. A foundation
must be laid before the impeaching testimony is admitted. The jury has the
right to believe or reject the substantive testimony of the witness," but
it should not consider the prior inconsistent statements as evidence of the
truth of the matter stated. 12 If a witness has merely failed to give the expected
testimony, and has testified to nothing that can harm the proponent, there is
no occasion to impeach himY13 In such a case evidence of prior inconsistent
statements would only serve the illegitimate purpose of having the jury misuse
N.W. 609 (1937), 36 MIcE. L. REv. 688 (1938). See also Horneman v. Brown, 286
Mass. 65, 190 N.E. 735, 48 HARv. L. REV. 139 (1934) (party impeached himself under
statute allowing impeachment of your witnesses). See 3 Wi0ORo, EVIDENCE §§ 897, 907
(3d ed. 1940).
8. Compare Kuhn v. United States, 24 F.2d 910 (9th Cir. 1928), cert. denied, 278
U.S. 605 (1928) (reason to believe witness would decline to testify as desired), with
Sullivan v. United States, 28 F.2d 147 (9th Cir. 1928), 14 IowA L. REv. 366, 38 YALE
L.J. 678 (1929) (only first of three witnesses signing same deposition could surprise
party). Contra: Witort v. Chicago & N.W.R.R., 170 Minn. 482, 212 N.W. 944 (1927)
(allowed surprise on same facts).
9. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 60 Sup. Ct. 811, 84 L. Ed.
1129 (1940) (allowing use of transcript before grand jury to refresh recollection of
hostile witness) ; Hickory v. United States, 151 U.S. 303, 14 Sup. Ct. 334, 38 L. Ed. 170
(1894). Notes, 74 A.L.R. 1042 (1931), 117 A.L.R. 326 (1938). Tennessee takes this
view. Record v. Copperage Co., 108 Tenn. 657, 69 S.W. 334 (1902) (frequently cited) ;
9 TENN. L. REV. 207 (1931).
10. Virginia Electric & Power Co. v. Hall, 184 Va. 102, 34 S.E.2d 382 (1945);
MORGAN AND MAGUIRE, CASES AND MATERIALS ON EVIDENc E 244-48 (3d ed. 1951); Note,
34 W. VA. L.Q. 306 (1928). For Tennessee requirement see Turner v. State, 188 Tenn.
312, 219 S.W.2d 188 (1949) (hostile witness did not give prejudicial testimony) ; King
v. State, 187 Tenn. 431, 215 S.W.2d 813 (1948), 20 TENN. L. REV. 780 (1949) (party
calling hostile witness was allowed to impeach him).
11. United States v. Michener, 152 F.2d 880 (3d Cir. 1945) ; Note, 56 YALE L.J.
583 (1947). But cf. Young v. United States, 97 F.2d 200, 205 (5th Cir. 1938), 17 TF.X.
L. REV. 373 (1939) ; State v. Hogan, 137 N.J.L. 497, 61 A.2d 70 (Sup. Ct. 1948), aff'd,
1 N.J. 375, 63 A.2d 886 (Sup. Ct. 1949).
12. Ellis v. United States, 138 F.2d 612, 616 (8th Cir. 1943); Hammond v.
Schuermann Building & Realty Co., 352 Mo. 418, 177 S.W.2d 618 (1944). Contra:
Pulitzer v. Chapman, 337 Mo. 298, 85 S.W.2d 400, 409 (1935), 1 Mo. L. REV. 89 (1936) ;
State v. Jolly, 112 Mont. 352, 116 P.2d 686, 687 (1941) ; Note, 8 MONT. L. REV. 39 (1947).
See MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE, Rule 106(1) (1942); 3 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 1017-19
(3d ed. 1940) ; McCormick, The Turncoat Witness: Previous Statements as Substantive
Evidence, 25 TEx. L. REv. 573 (1947); 1949 ANNUAL SURVEY OF AmERICAN LAW 978;
Note, 14 Mo. L. REV. 291 (1949) (proposed Missouri Code incorporated Professor
McCormick's view).
13. Young v. United States 97 F.2d 200 (5th Cir. 1938), 7 FORD. L. REV. 452, 17
TEx. L. REv. 373 (1939). But cf. State v. Noel, 66 N.D. 676, 268 N.W. 654 (1936), 21
MINN. L. REV. 603 (1937); 3 WIGmORE, EVIDENCE § 905 (3d ed. 1940); Note, 11 Omo
ST. L.J. 364 (1950). For state stautes see 1949 ANNUAL SURVEY OF AMRICAN LAW 987-
82; Callahan and Ferguson, Evidence and The New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 47
YALE L.J. 194, 203 (1937) ; Ladd, supra note 2.
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it as being true.14 This is generally recognized in judicial opinions, but the
tendency is to relax these requirements, as is indicated by the principal case.15
The orthodox rule is still applied to exclude any evidence of the witness'
bad moral character, and generally to exclude that of bias, interest or corrup-
tion.'6 Its unreasonableness is most apparent where the adverse party is called
as a witness, 17 and it may exercise an unfortunate influence in connection with
the matter of presumptions arising from a failure to produce a witness.' 8
It may also possibly operate to prevent an otherwise desirable consolidation of
actions. 19 Although the commentators do not agree on its past, they agree that
the rule should have no future.
EVIDENCE-PRIVILEGE OF ACCUSED NOT TO TAKE THE STAND-
"COMMENT" BY PROSECUTOR ON ACCUSED'S CONDUCT
DURING TRIAL AS UNFAIR INTERFERENCE WITH
PRIVILEGE
Defendant was being tried for murder. During the closing argument
the prosecutor called the attention of the jury to the manner in which the
defendant had allegedly discussed certain photographs of the scene of the
crime with his attorney in the courtroom as tending to show the familiarity
of the defendant with the scene of the crime. The defendant was con-
victed and appealed. Held, reversed.' The prosecutor's action infringed
14. Fournier v. United States, 58 F.2d 3 (7th Cir. 1932), cert. denied, 286 U.S. 565
(1932) ; People v. Johnson, 333 Ill. 469, 165 N.E. 235 (1929). In Tennessee the rule
is relaxed where witness is necessary. King v. State, 187 Tenn. 431, 215 S.W.2d 813
(1948).
15. 235 P.2d at 853; cf. People v. Newson, 37 Cal.2d 34, 230 P.2d 618 (1951).
16. See 3 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 900, 901 (3d ed. 1940).
17. Webber v. Jackson, 79 Mich. 175, 44 N.W. 591, 592 (1890) (incongruous to
claim that plaintiff, putting defendant on to show his fraud, gives him credit for honesty).
But ef. Mississippi Glass Co. v. Franzen, 143 Fed. 501 (3d Cir. 1906) (vouches for
adversary's veracity); American Smelting & Refining Co., v. Hyman, 16 F.2d 39 (6th
Cir. 1926), 16 GEO. L.J. 269 (1928) ; Bank of Hendersonville v. Dozier, 24 Tenn. App.
178, 142 S.W.2d 191 (M.S. 1940) (could not discredit adversary's truthful character).
Prior inconsistent statements are admissible as admissions regardless of the rule. People
v. Michaels, 335 Ill. 590, 167 N.E. 857 (1929). But cf. Hale v. Johnston, 140 Tenn. 182,
203 S.W. 949, 954 (1918). For a discussion of statutes see Note, 21 COL. L. REV. 815
(1921).
18. Stewart v. Herrin Transportation Co., 37 So.2d 30 (La. App. 1948) (court per-
mitted the inference from plaintiff's failure to produce a hostile witness) ; People v. Riley,
191 Misc. 888, 83 N.Y.S.2d 281 (Co. Ct. 1948), 62 HARv. L. REV. 1234 (1949) (con-
viction reversed for failure to call witness) ; McGehee v. Perkins, 188 Va. 116, 49 S.E.2d
304 (1948). For a discussion of the presumptions see 2 WIGMNIORE, EVIDENCE §§ 286-88
(3d ed. 1940).
19. Cf. Brown v. United States, 56 F.2d 997 (9th Cir. 1932); State v. Crooker,
123 Me. 310, 122 Atl. 865 (1923), 22 Micr. L. REV. 734, 37 HARv. L. REV. 780 (1924).
1. Although the vote for reversal was six to one, only three judges agreed that
the prosecutor's statement constituted infringement of defendant's privilege against
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the defendant's constitutional right not to take the stand since the statement
could be contradicted only by direct testimony of the defendant which would
constitute a waiver of his privilege. This infringment could not be cured
by instructions from the court. State v. Hoover, 219 La. 872, 54 So.2d
130 (1951).
The privilege of an accused to refuse to testify against himself is aided
by statutes or holdings that the exercise of this privilege shall not be the
subject of comment by the prosecutor or the court and that it shall not
create a presumption that his testimony would be prejudicial to his cause,
2
But for several years there has been a trend toward abolishing these
restrictions. 3
Granting, however, that comment by the prosecutor is forbidden, the
question still remains: what kind of statement by a prosecutor in his argu-
ment to the jury constitutes a comment upon defendant's exercise of his
privilege? Obviously, the comment may be so direct and unambiguous that
no real question is presented.- Thus in the classic case of State v. Marceaux,5
relied on by the court in the instant case,0 the prosecutor asked, "Why did
not [defendant] go on the stand and testify in his own behalf, if he was not
guilty? He had the right to do so."
'7
self-incrimination. The dissent was on the ground that this was no comment on
defendant's failure to testify, and that comment, itself, is not an infringement of
defendant's privilege. One justice concurred without opinion and another in a con-
curring opinion reasoned that, while there was no infringment of the privilege here, the
prosecutor's statement was reversible error since it was an expression of belief not
based on evidence adduced at the trial. On a petition for rehearing and the refusal
thereof, another member of the court dissented on substantially the same ground as the
concurring opinion in the main decision.
2. Ford v. State, 184 Tenn. 443, 201 S.W.2d 539 (1945); Hutchins v. State, 172
Tenn. 108, 110 S.W.2d 319 (1937); Hays v. State, 159 Tenn. 388, 19 S.W.2d 313
(1929). For representative statutes see, e.g., 62 STAT. 833 (1948), 18 U.S.C.A. § 3481
(1951) (no presumption from failure to testify); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 918.09 (1944)
(comment by prosecutor forbidden); TENN. CODE ANN. § 9783 (Williams 1934) no
presumption. For complete citations of English, Dominion and American cases, see
8 Wi GmoRE, EvIDENCE § 2272 (3d ed. 1940).
3. See, e.g., 8 WIGmoRE, EviDENcE 412 (3d ed. 1940). This trend was retarded
somewhat by the actions of the highest courts of Massachusetts and South Dakota in
the late thirties when they declared statutes allowing comment to be in conflict with
state constitutional provisions granting the privilege against self-incrimination. In re
Opinion of the Justices, 300 Mass. 620, 15 N.E.2d 662 (1938) ; State v. Wolfe, 64 S.D.
178, 266 N.W. 116 (1936). A contrary view was taken, however, in the more recent
case of State v. Baker, 115 Vt. 94, 53 A.2d 53, 57 YALE L.J. 145 (1947).
4. Keifer v. State, 204 Ind. 454, 184 N.E. 557 (1933); State v. Richardson, 175
La. 823, 144 So. 587 (1932); State v. Sinigal, 138 La. 469, 70 So. 478 (1915); State
v. Robinson, 112 La. 939, 36 So. 811 (1904); State v. Marceaux, 50 La. Ann. 1137,
24 So. 611 (1898); Seattle v. Hawley, 13 Wash.2d 357, 124 P.2d 961 (1942). But cf.
Langford v. United States, 178 F.2d 48 (9th Cir. 1949); Arant v. State, 232 Ala.
275, 167 So. 540 (1936) ; Riley v. State, 57 Okla. Cr. 313, 49 P.2d 813 (1935).
5. 50 La. Ann. 1137, 24 So. 611 (1898).
6. 54 So.2d at 131.
7. 24 So. at 613.
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A problem is presented where the comment is less direct. In the in-
stant case, the prosecutor's statement was not strictly a comment upon
defendant's exercise of the privilege, but rather it had the effect of forcing
the defendant to go on the stand in order to rebut the argument presented.
Nevertheless, the result is the same in each case; the value of the defendant's
privilege is insufficiently protected.s The court held that the prosecutor's
statement deprived the defendant of his privilege and was reversible error
necessitating a new trial.
Mr. Wigmore has indicated that the prohibition against presumption
from failure to testify and comment thereon conflicts with the general
proposition that "a party's failure to produce evidence which, if favorable,
would naturally have been produced, is open to the inference [and presum-
ably the comment thereon] that the facts were unfavorable to his cause.""
It becomes necessary then to distinguish "the boundary of the prohibited
inference."'1 Many cases have held that an otherwise innocent statement
accompanied by a gesture toward the defendant can be considered a com-
ment on his refusal to testify." Other cases treat as reversible error a
comment by the prosecutor that certain evidence is "uncontradicted" where
the evidence which is so described could, in the final analysis, be contra-
dicted only by the defendant.'
2
On the other hand, the dissent in the instant case presents a forceful
argument that since defendant's voluntary conduct in the courtroom is not
subject to the privilege, the prosecutor may comment upon it.'3 A number
8. Cf. 8 WiGmoRE, EviDExcm 424 (3d ed. 1940).
9. Id. at 426. For cases illustrating this conflict, see: United States v. Brothman,
191 F.2d 70 (2d Cir. 1951) ; Slakoff v. United States, 8 F.2d 9 (3d Cir. 1925) ; People
v. Birger, 329 Ill. 352, 160 N.E. 564 (1928) ; People v. Paisley, 299 Ill. 576, 132 N.E.
822 (1921); State v. Bryan, 175 La. 422, 143 So. 362 (1932); State v. Glauson, 165
La. 270, 115 So. 484 (1928); State v. Lewis, 101 So. 386 (La. 1924); Riley v. State,
57 Okla. Cr. 313, 49 P.2d 813 (1935); Miller v. Commonwealth, 153 Va. 890, 149
S.E. 459 (1929) ; cf. Keifer v. State, 204 Ind. 454, 184 N.E. 557 (1933) ; see State v.
Marceaux, 50 La. Ann. 1137, 24 So. 611, 614 (1898). But cf. State v. Carr, 25 La.
Ann. 407 (1873).
10. 8 WIGmoRE, EVmm-NcE 427 (3d ed. 1940).
11. See, e.g., State v. Sinigal, 138 La. 469, 70 So. 478 (1915) ; State v. Robinson,
112 La. 939, 36 So. 811 (1904) ; State v. Paschall, 182 Wash. 304, 47 P.2d 15 (1935).
12. Barnes v. United States, 8 F.2d. 832 (8th Cir. 1925) ; Linden v. United States,
296 Fed. 104 (3d Cir. 1924) ; State v. Robinson, 184 S.W.2d 1017 (Mo. 1945) ; State
v. Paschall, 182 Wash. 304, 47 P.2d 15 (1935) ; see Langford v. United States, 178 F.2d
48, 55 (9th Cir. 1949) ; State v. Conner, 142 La. 631, 77 So. 482, 483 (1917). Contra:
People v. Birger, 329 Ill. 352, 160 N.E. 564 (1928) ; cf. Arant v. State, 232 Ala. 275,
167 So. 540 (1936) ; Roberts v. State, 122 Ala. 47, 25 So. 238 (1899) ; People v. Paisley,
299 Ill. 576, 132 N.E. 822 (1921); State v. Zemple, 196 Minn. 159, 264 N.W. 587
(1936); Riley v. State, 57 Okla. Cr. 313, 49 P.2d 813 (1935); see State v. Glauson,
165 La. 270, 115 So. 484, 488 (1928) ; Miller v. Commonwealth, 153 Va. 890, 149 S.E.
459, 462 (1929).
13. 54 So.2d at 133 et seq.
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of cases have so held.14  Certainly, the defendant's familiarity with the scene
of the crime was a relevant factor in the case. Yet there is an element of
unfairness about the prosecutor's statement here which distinguishes it from
mere derogatory comments upon the defendant's appearance and demeanor
in court.' 5 The concurring opinion' G and the dissent 17 to the refusal to
grant a rehearing indicate a realization of this unfairness, though neither
is willing to follow the "majority's"'8 rather tenuous reasoning that the
prosecutor's statement constituted comment upon the defendant's failure
to take the stand. It would seem, moreover, that the proposition that a
prosecutor may comment upon the defendant's actions in the courtroom
without infringing the privilege against self-incrimination is inconsistent
with the theory that a prosecutor may not comment upon the defendant's
failure to contradict testimony where the only method of overcoming such
testimony would be for defendant to take the stand himself. The incon-
sistency becomes apparent in the instant case if it is granted that the
prosecutor's statement did tend to force defendant to take the stand.'0
Although there was not a majority of the Supreme Court of Louisiana
willing to predicate its decision upon the theory that the prosecutor had
commented upon the defendant's exercise of his privilege against self-
incrimination, the majority of the court was equally unwilling by judicial
decision to abolish the prohibition against comment.20
14. Brothers v. State, 236 Ala. 448, 183 So. 433 (1938) ; State v. Serna, 69 Ariz.
181, 211 P.2i1 455 (1949); State v. McKinnon, 158 Iowa 619, 138 N.W. 523 (1912);
Armstrong v. Commonwealth, 190 Ky. 217, 227 S.W. 162 (1921); Norris v. State,
64 S.W. 1044 (Tex. Crim. App. 1901) ; cf. State v. Black, 150 Ore. 269, 42 P.2d 171
(1935). A related problem is the extent to which the accused may be required to per-
form certain acts in the courtroom. See Note, 171 A.L.R. 1144 (1947).
15. See, e.g., the prosecutor's language in Norris v. State, 64 S.W. 1044, 1045 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1901): "Through all of this trial, during the testimony and argument, the
defendant has sat in his seat without any sign of emotion or change in his countenance.
Look at him, gentlemen [pointing finger at defendant,-the size of his hands and
how he crouches in his chair like some wild animal ...You have a right to look
at him, and judge of his action."
16. 54 So.2d at 135.
17. Id at 136.
18. See note 1 supra.
19. Compare the dissenting opinion to the refusal to grant a rehearing in the instant
case: "But not in evidence, and about which the jury had no knowledge whatever,
was the essence of the discussion or conversation carried on between the accused and his
counsel.... Surely it cannot be concluded that such conversation, inaudible to the jury,
necessarily concerned the actual scene of the crime. It might well be that the parties were
agreeing that the photograps were perfect likenesses of a place in New York or Boston
or Chicago. No one knows, except them, exactly what they were saying to each other."
54 So.2d at 137 (emphasis supplied).
20. Cf. State v. Bentley, 219 La. 893, 54 So.2d 137 (1951), decided the same
day as the instant case, in which Chief Justice Fournet unequivocally rejected the con-
tentions of Justice Hawthorne (concurring at 142) that comment on defendant's failure
to take the stand is not reversible error. This refusal to allow comment was based on
statutory interpretation. Compare State v. Banks, 78 Me. 490, 7 Atl. 269 (1886), where
there was no constitutional privilege against self-crimination and legislation was passed
forbidding comment, after some years experience with a statute allowing comment, with
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FULL FAITH AND CREDIT-APPLICATION TO WRONGFUL DEATH
STATUTE-REFUSAL TO ENFORCE FOREIGN STATUTE WHEN SUIT
COULD BE BROUGHT WHERE CAUSE OF ACTION AROSE
Decedent was killed in an airliner crash in Utah. This is an action
under the Utah wrongful death statute in the United States district court of
Illinois, by his executor, an Illinois bank, against the airlines company, a
Delaware corporation doing business in Illinois. The district court held for
the defendant on the basis of an Illinois statute providing that no action under
a foreign wrongful death statute could be brought within the state when it
was possible to maintain an action in the state where the cause of action arose.'
The court of appeals affirmed. Held (5-2-2),2 reversed. Full faith and credit
must be given to the Utah statute. First National Bank of Chicago v. United
Air Lines, Inc., 72 Sup. Ct. 421 (1952).
In Hughes v. Fetter,3 decided last June, the Supreme Court held that
the full faith and credit clause may apply to state statutes and that this clause
was violated by the refusal of the State of Wisconsin to enforce any cause of
action for wrongful death arising outside the state. This holding was dis-
tinguished by the court below on the ground that the Illinois statute permits
the bringing of a foreign action if it could not be brought in the state where
it arose. The Supreme Court regards this distinction as "not crucial."
A note on the Hughes case in the preceding issue of this Review gives a
detailed analysis of the problems involved.4 The pendency of the instant case
before the Court was noted and it was predicted that it would be reversed.0
To what was then said it may now be added that this holding does not neces-
sarily prevent a proper application of the doctrine of forum non conveniens.6
State v. Ferguson, 226 Iowa 361, 283 N.W. 917 (1939), where the reverse situation took
place in the absence of a constitutionally granted privilege. The majority opinion in
State v. Bentley, supra, indicates in a dictum that a statute allowing comment might be
unconstitutional, 54 So.2d at 141. In 1912 Ohio amended its constitution to allow com-
ment, thus avoiding the problem of unconstitutionality of legislation forbidding comment.
OHIO CoNsT. Art. 1 § 10. Connecticut allows comment by the court only, in the face
of a rather ambiguous statute. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 6480 (1930), construed in State v.
Heno, 119 Conn. 29, 174 Atl. 181 (1934). The same is true in England, see The Queen
v. Rhodes, [1899] 1 Q.B. 77, construing 61 & 62 Vicr., c. 36, § 1 (1898). See also
8 WmGoRE, EVIENCE § 2272 (3d ed. 1940) for complete citations.
1. "[N]o action shall be brought or prosecuted in this State to recover damages for
a death occurring outside of this State where a right of action for such death arises under
the laws of the place where such death occurred and service of process in such suit may
be had upon the defendant in such place." ILL. STAT. ANN. c. 70, § 2 (Smith-Hurd 1936).
2. Opinion by Black, J.; concurring opinion by Jackson, J. (Minton, J., concurring);
dissents by Frankfurter and Reed, JJ.
3. 341 U.S. 609, 71 Sup. Ct. 980, 95 L. Ed. 822 (1951).
4. Note, State Statutes and The Full Faith and Credit Clause-Hughes v. Fetter,
5 VAND. L. REv. 203 (1952).
5. Id. at 210.'
6. Cf. id. at 210-11.
1952]
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
INCOME TAXATION-PRIZE CONTEST AWARDS-MUSICAL
COMPOSITION PRIZE AS INCOME
In 1945, a philanthropist, who was also president of the Detroit Or-
chestra, Inc., offered three awards for the best symphonic compositions writ-
ten by native-born composers of North, Central and South America. The
underlying purpose of the awards was to further a spirit of understanding
among the Pan-American nations and to bring to the public the best new
music written in the Americas. Upon learning of the awards the taxpayer
submitted a symphonic work which he had composed prior to the announce-
ment of the awards. In 1947 he was awarded first prize. He reported the
amount in his tax return for that year, and a petition for a refund having
been refused, he brought suit in the district court, which held that the award
was a gift and therefore not taxable as income. Held, reversed. When a person
submits the product of his skill and training in a contest and receives a prize,
the necessary elements of a "gift" are not present. United States v. Robertson,
190 F.2d 680 (10th Cir. 1951).
Income has been broadly defined as gain derived from capital, labor or
both combined, including profit through the sale or conversion of capital
assets.' Under section 22(a) of the Internal Revenue Code a tax is levied oil
"income derived from any source whatever."'2 However, under section 22(b)
(3) Congress has expressly excluded the value of property acquired by gift
from the determination of gross income.3
The payment of prize money or awards falls into one of two categories:
it is either compensation or a gift. What factors have the courts considered
in determining whether the sum is to be treated as a gift or whether it is
compensation within the meaning of the act? The traditional approach has
been to define a gift as a voluntary transfer of one's property to another
without consideration or compensation therefor.4 This places the emphasis
1. See, e.g., Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 40 Sup. Ct. 189, 64 L. Ed. 521
(1919); Drier v. Helvering, 72 F.2d 76 (D.C. Cir. 1934); Chicago & N.W. Ry. v.
Commissioner, 66 F.2d 61 (7th Cir. 1933) ; Wells v. Commissioner, 63 F.2d 425 (8th Cir.
1933).
2. INT. REV. CODE § 22(a).
3. Id. § 22(b)(3).
4. This definition seems to have first appeared in Gray v. Barton, 55 N.Y. 68
(1873). It has been adopted either in substance or by word in most jurisdictions
today. Blair v. Rosseter, 33 F.2d 286 (9th Cir. 1929); Noel v. Parrott, 15 F.2d 669
(4th Cir. 1926); Ex parte Barefoot, 201 N.C. 393, 160 S.E. 365 (1931) ; Saba v.
Cleveland Trust Co., 23 Ohio App. 163, 154 N.E. 799 (1926). Another definition fre-
quently used by the courts is that if the award was received gratuitously and in
exchange for nothing, it is a gift. Helvering v. American Dental Co., 318 U.S. 322,
63 Sup. Ct. 577, 87 L. Ed. 785 (1943). "[T]here is an evident trend in the decisions
towards tightening the definition of a gift so as to throw the receipt of the property
into a taxable category rather than into the nontaxable category of gifts." 1 MERTENS,
LAW OF FEDER&AL TAXATION 233 (1942). It should be noticed that the mere fact that a




upon the motivation of the donor. 5 Whether such a donative motive existed
at the time of the transfer is a question of fact to be determined by the trier of
the facts.0 Circumstances evidencing the requisite donative intent are: (1)
lack of consideration; 7 (2) an act of spontaneous generosity ;8 (3) a personal
motive, such as love and affection, as contrasted with a commercial or finan-
cial motive; 9 (4) absence of legal or moral obligation to pay ;1° and (5)
philanthropic, charitable or educational objectives which will benefit the
general public." On the other hand, courts have considered the following
factors as tending to negate a donative intent: (1) that the payor received
consideration, for example, past services rendered by payee ;12 (2) that there
was a benefit to the payor such as furthering its advertising or commercial
purposes ;13 (3) that the entries became the property of the payor ;14 and (4)
that the payor claimed the amount of the award as a business deduction.' 5
5. A gift always involves the intention of the donor. Green v. Sutherland, 40
Misc. 559, 82 N.Y. Supp. 878 (Sup. Ct. 1903); Farleigh v. Cadman, 159 N.Y. 169.
53 N.E. 808 (1899). However, the instant case has taken a diametrically opposed view
by adopting a rule which disregards the donor's intent.
6. Schall v. Commissioner, 174 F.2d 893 (5th Cir. 1949); see Bogardus v. Com-
missioner, 302 U.S. 34, 45, 58 Sup. Ct. 61, 82 L. Ed. 32 (1937) (dissenting opinion').
7. Bogardus v. Commissioner, 302 U.S. 34, 58 Sup. Ct. 61, 82 L. Ed. 32 (1937);
McDermott v. Commissioner, 150 F.2d 585 (D.C. Cir. 1945); Schumacher v. United
States, 55 F.2d 1007 (Ct. Cl. 1932) ; Washburn v. Commissioner, 5 T.C. 1333 (1945) ;
Knowles v. Commissioner, 5 T.C. 525 (1945) ; Martin v. Martin, 202 Ill. 382, 67 N.E. 1
(1903).
8. Bogardus v. Commissioner, 302 U.S. 34, 58 Sup. Ct. 61, 82 L. Ed. 32 (1937);
United States v. Merriam, 263 U.S. 179, 44 Sup. Ct. 69, 68 L. Ed. 240 (1923). "An
important characteristic of gifts is that, unlike many sorts of 'income,' they cannot
be counted on in advance .... " McDermott v. Commissioner, 150 F.2d 585, 588
(D.C. Cir. 1945).
9. Simpkinson v. Commissioner, 89 F.2d 397 (5th Cir. 1937) ; Bass v. Hawley, 62
F.2d 721 (5th Cir. 1933); Marshall Drug Co. v. United States, 95 F. Supp. 820 (Ct.
CI. 1951) ; cf. Washburn v. Commissioner, 5 T.C. 1333 (1945).
10. Bogardus v. Commissioner, 302 U.S. 34, 58 Sup. Ct. 61, 82 L. Ed. 32 (1937);
Dewling v. United States, 101 F. Supp. 892 (Ct. Cl. 1952) ; Washburn v. Commissioner.
5 T.C. 1333 (1945). But cf. United States v. McCormick, 67 F.2d 867 (2d Cir. 1933),
cert. denied, 291 U.S. 662 (1934), where it is stated that mere absence of a legal con-
sideration or duty to pay does not make a payment a gift within the meaning of the
Revenue Act.
11. McDermott v. Commissioner, 150 F.2d 585 (D.C. Cir. 1945); Simpkinson v.
Commissioner, 89 F.2d 397 (5th Cir. 1937); Bass v. Hawley, 62 F.2d 721 (5th Cir.
1933); Amirikian v. United States, 100 F. Supp. 263 (D. Md. 1951); 31 VA. L. REv.
959 (1945) ; 14 FoRD L. REv. 249 (1945). Contra: the instant case, 190 F.2d 680.
12. Bausch's Estate v. Commissioner, 186 F.2d 313 (2d Cir. 1951); Roberts v.
Commissioner, 176 F.2d 221 (9th Cir. 1949) ; Baboquivari Cattle Co. v. Commissioner,
135 F.2d 114 (9th Cir. 1943); Noel v. Parrott, 15 F.2d 669 (4th Cir. 1926). A
number of courts holding contrary to this maintain that a payment is none the less a
gift because inspired by gratitude for past faithful service of the recipient. Bogardus
v. Commissioner, 302 U.S. 34, 58 Sup. Ct. 61, 82 L. Ed. 32 (1937); Schall v. Com-
missioner, 174 F.2d 893 (5th Cir. 1949).
13. Stein v. Commissioner, 14 T.C. 494 (1950) ; Waugh v. Commissioner, 19 P-H
1950 TC Mem. Dec. j 50,095 (1950). But cf. Washburn v. Commissioner, 5 T.C. 1333
(1945), where the Turns Co. gave $900 on a commercial radio program and the amount
was held to be a gift.
14. Stein v. Commissioner, 14 T.C. 494 (1950). See note 17 infra, for the rights
received in the instant case. Contra: McDermott v. Commissioner, 150 F.2d 585 (D.C.
Cir. 1945); Amirikian v. United States, 100 F. Supp. 263 (D. Md. 1951).
15. Bausch's Estate v. Commissioner, 186 F.2d 313 (2d Cir. 1951) ; Noel v. Parrott,
15 F.2d 669 (4th Cir. 1926) ; Dasteel v. Rogan, 41 F. Supp. 836 (S.D. Cal. 1941) ; Stein
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In the instant case the court departed from the traditional test by placing
the emphasis upon the acts of the recipient saying that: "The taxability of
the prize or award is to be determined in accordance with the law applicable
to the person receving it."'16 While the court could have justified its holding
on a theory that would be entirely consistent with the traditional view, it
refused to base its decision upon the narrow ground that the relinquishment
of certain performance and publication rights by the winner was a considera-
tion sufficient to refute a donative intent. 7 Rather it held that when a person
submits the product of his skill and training in a contest and receives a prize,
the necessary elements of a gift are not present.1 8
Thus, the question arises as to how far this shift away from the tradi-
tional test will be carried. Relying on the theory of the instant case, the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue has issued a ruling which has created
uncertainties as to the tax status of grants, fellowships and scholarships.
In it he has ruled that when the recipient of a grant or fellowship applies his
skill and training to advance research, creative work or some other project or
activity, the amount received is includible in gross income; but, when the
grant or fellowship is made for the training and education of an individual, no
services being rendered therefor, the amount is to be considered as a gift.19
This ruling, like the instant case, places the emphasis on the recipient's acts
rather than the donor's intent. It would seem to make the typical college
scholarship taxable. Such awards are either given in recognition of past
attainment of superior grades or have, as a condition of continuance, minimum
grade requirements. In either case the award is predicated upon the results
of the applicant's "skill and training". But to treat such awards as taxable
income runs counter to the long standing rulings on this subject. Furthermore,
it appears socially undesirable and is without justification under what was
heretofore the traditional approach of the courts, under which the motivation
of the donor was the decisive factor.
v. Commissioner, 14 T.C. 494 (1950). But cf. Washburn v. Commissioner, 5 T.C. 1333
(1945).
16. 190 F.2d at 683.
17. Ibid. A condition required by the contest rules was that each composition
receiving a cash award, honorable mention or a certificate of merit would remain the
property of the composer except that he would be required to grant to the Detroit
Orchestra, Inc., all synchronization rights as applied to motion pictures and all
mechanical rights as applied to phonograph recordings, electrical transcriptions and
music rolls. The Orchestra was also granted the exclusive rights to authorize the first
performance and to designate the publishers of the winning compositions. See 190 F.2d
at 681 n.2. The relinquishment of these rights would seem to be a sufficient considera-
tion to negative a donative intent. if the court had so held, it would have reached the
same result but upon a sounder basis which would be consistent with the traditional view.
18. 190 F.2d at 683.
19. I.T. 4056, 1951 INT. Rav. BULL. No. 17 at 2 (1951). Contra: McDermott v.
Commissioner, 150 F.2d 585 (D.C. Cir. 1945) ; Amirikian v. United States, 100 F. Supp.
263 (D. Md. 1951). Also see 14 FORD L. Ray. 249 (1945) ; 31 VA. L. REV. 959 (1945).
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REAL PROPERTY-WATER RIGHTS-PUBLIC RIGHTS OF FISHING AND
NAVIGATION OVER FLOODED LANDS
Plaintiffs are the lessees of a flooded tract of land on which the public
has been boating and fishing. The land was used for residential and agri-
cultural purposes until 1938. In that year a river levee broke, flooding the
tract with up to six feet of water, the land remaining flooded ever since.
Plaintiffs leased the land in 1947, with the intention of charging a fee for
the privilege of fishing in the waters over the land and attempted to bar
the public from fishing on the tract. Plaintiffs obtained an injunction pro-
hibiting defendants and other members of the public from fishing in the
flooded tract, and defendants appealed. Held, reversed. Although the title
to the land remains in the owner, the public, because of the navigability of
the waters, has a right to use the water above the tract for boating and
fishing, provided they do so without trespassing on plaintiffs' land. Bohn v.
Albertson, 238 P.2d 128 (Calif. App. 1951).
At English common law, the king held title to the beds of all water-
courses in which there was an ebb and flow of the tide;1 the rights of
navigation and fishing were in the public.2  The title to the beds of all
other streams was in the riparian owners,3 who had the exclusive right of
fishery, but subject to a public easement of navigation. 4 In the United
States, some courts have followed this common law classification in determin-
ing bed ownership, 5 but others have held that the state has title to the
bed of all streams capable of navigation. 6 One court draws a distinction
1. See Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 11, 12, 14 Sup. Ct. 548, 38 L. Ed. 331
(1893); 1 FARNHAM, WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 38 (1904); Note, TExAs L.
REv. 72 (1933). After the Revolution, title to lands under tide waters which had been
vested in the king became vested in the states in which they were situated. People v.
New York and Staten Island Ferry Co., 68 N.Y. 71 (1877).
2. Smith v. Andrews, [1891] 2 Ch. 678. The king's proprietary interest in the
tidelands is known as the jits privatwm, which could be granted to private individuals.
However, the public's easement of fishing and navigation, the jus publicun could not
be abridged by the king; hence all grants of tidal waters were subject to the public
rights. See 27 MIcH. L. REv. 84 (1928). For historical treatment, see I FARNIAM,
WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS §§ 36 et seq. (1904).
3. See Ewing v. Colquhoun, [1877] 2 A.C. 839. Where there are two riparian
owners, each owns to the "thread" or- center line of the stream, irrespective of the
Ication of the channel. Farris v. Bentley, 141 Wis. 671, 124 N.W. 1003 (1910) ; 2
TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 661 (3d ed., Jones, 1939).
4. Smith v. Andrews, [1891] 2 Ch. 678. For a discussion of the historical origin
of the public easement of navigation, see 1 FARNHAM, WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS
§ 23 (1904).
5. See, e.g., Hendrick v. Cook, 4 Ga. 241 (1848); Lorman v. Benson, 9 Mich.
237, 77 Am. Dec. 435 (1860); New Orleans, M. & C. R.R. v. Fredric, 46 Miss. 1
(1871); Day v. Pittsburgh, Y. & C. R.R., 44 Ohio St. 406, 7 N.E. 528 (1886).
6. See, e.g., Bullock v. Wilson, 2 Port. 436 (Ala. 1835); St. Louis, .IU. & S.
Ry. v. Ramsey, 53 Ark. 314, 13 S.W. 931 (1890); People v. Gold Run Ditch &
Mining Co., 66 Cal. 155, 4 Pac. 1150 (1884); Flanagan v. Philadelphia, 42 Pa. 219
(1862). The usual explanation for these decisions is that in England the only rivers
of importance were tidal, whereas in this country the great rivers of commerce
are non-tidal, so that public policy required that title be in the state to preserve free
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between those streams navigable in fact and those which are commercially
navigable, holding title to the former to be in the riparian owner. 7 Owner-
ship of non-navigable watercourses is universally held to be in the riparian
owner.
8
It seems well settled that once title to land is acquired, it is not affected
by the fact that the property later becomes submerged under navigable
waters by avulsion.9 This is true even in those states where title to the
bed of navigable streams is in the state.'0  Furthermore, the landowner in
such cases has a right to drain or reclaim the land if possible." However,
since a public right of way exists in all navigable waters, whether or not
title is in the state, the public has an easement of navigation in the waters
covering the submerged property.'
2
In those states where the riparian owners of non-tidal streams own
the bed, a strict application of common law principles would give them
the exclusive right to fish in the stream.13 This is not always the case,
however. The fact that, at common law, the public right of fishing was co-
extensive with the right of navigation in tidal waters owned by the state,
has led some American jurisdictions to disregard the separate nature of
these rights.' 4 In these states, the public right of fishing is held to extend to
all ordinary navigable waters, regardless of who owns the stream bed,'8
navigation. See Carson v. Blazer, 2 Binn. 475 (Pa. 1810); Town of Ravenswood v.
Fleming, 22 W. Va. 52, 46 Am. Rep. 485 (1883). For a discussion of the various
tests by which navigability is determined, see 1 FARNHAM, WATERS AND WATER
RIGHTS § 23 (1904) ; 65 C.J.S., Navigable Waters §§ 1-9 (1950).
7. State v. West Tennessee Land Co., 127 Tenn. 575, 158 S.W. 746 (1913) ; Stuart
v. Clark's Lessee, 32 Tenn. 1 (1852).
8. See People v. Grand Rapids-Mfuskegon Power Co., 164 Mich. 121, 129 N.W.
211 (1910), and cases collected in 2 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY 706 n.73 (3d ed., Jones,
1939).
9. See e.g., Wheeler v. Spinola, 54 N.Y. 377 (1873); State v. West Tennessee
Land Co., 127 Tenn. 575, 158 S.W. 746 (1913); Fisher v. Barber, 21 S.W.2d 569
(Tex. Civ. App. 1929). In this connection, avulsion, the sudden subsidence or tearing
away of land, must be distinguished from erosion, the gradual tearing away. As a
general rule where land is inundated by erosion, title is lost to the state. See 65
C.J.S., Navigable Waters §§ 86-87 (1950).
10. See, e.g., Clement v. Watson, 63 Fla. 109, 58 So. 25 (1912) (tide water).
11. Schwartzstein v. B. B. Bathing Park, Inc., 203 App. Div. 700, 197 N.Y. Supp.
490 (2d Dep't 1922).
12. Schulte v. Warren, 218 Ill. 108, 75 N.E. 783 (1905) ; Sterling v. Jackson,
69 Mich. 488, 37 N.W. 845 (1888); State v. West Tennessee Land Co., 127 Tenn.
575, 158 S.W. 746 (1913).
13. At common law the rights of fishing and navigation were separate and dis-
tinct, and the exclusive right of fishing followed the ownership of the stream bed. See
Holyoke Co. v. Lyman, 15 Wall. 500, 21 L. Ed. 133 (1873) and cases cited note 12
supra.
14. See Note, 12 TEXAS L. REv. 72, 75 (1933).
15. Forestier v. Johnson, 164 Cal. 24, 127 Pac. 156 (1912); Winous Point
Shooting Club v. Slaughterbeck, 96 Ohio St. 139, 117 N.E. 162 (1917) ; Willow River
Club v. Wade, 100 Wis. 86, 76 N.W. 273 (1898). In this connection there is no
distinction drawn between fishing and hunting from a boat. See Bodi v. Winous
Point Shooting Club, 57 Ohio St. 226, 48 N.E. 944 (1897).
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the courts regarding fishing as "incident to the right of navigation."' 6
But a majority of American courts do recognize the common law distinc-
tions on this point, holding that the right to fish and hunt is an incident
of land ownership, exclusive in the riparian owner.17
Cases, other than the instant one, have been unanimous in allowing the
owner a private right of fishing wherever property, formerly dry land or
covered by shallow water, is inundated by navigable waters, as in the in-
stant case.' 8 This is true even in states which do not normally recognize
private fishing rights in such waters.' 9  In the present case the California
court has departed from this usual view by extending public fishing rights
to all public waters, regardless of the fact that the land was flooded after
acquisition by the owner. Although at variance with the traditional con-
cepts of land ownership,20 this result is consistent with the essentially public
nature of inland fishing in this country,21 generally regulated and supported
through public funds.
16. Diana Shooting Club v. Husting, 156 Wis. 261, 145 N.W. 816, 819 (1914).
In Michigan the same result is reached, but on a sounder basis. "I do not think
that it can be said that fishing is an incident of navigation. The 'navigability of a
stream or lake, however, fixes its public character ... and the right of fishing in
public waters is a public right.... .Collins v. Gerhardt, 237 Mich. 38, 211 N.W.
115, 119 (1926).
17. See, e.g., Holyoke Co. v. Lyman, 15 Wall. 500, 21 L. Ed. 133 (1873);
Clement v. Watson, 63 Fla. 109, 58 So. 25 (1912) ; Schulte v. Warren,. 218 II1. 108,
75 N.E. 783 (1905) ; State v. West Tennessee Land Co., 127 Tenn. 575, 158 S.W. 746
(1913); Fisher v. Barber, 21 S.W.2d 569 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929); Knudson v. Hull, 46
Utah 114, 148 Pac. 1070 (1915).
18. See cases cited note 17 supra.
19. Compare Sterling v. Jackson, 69 Mich. 488, 37 N.W. 845 (1888) (right
of private fishing upheld on land flooded by navigable waters), with Collins v.
Gerhardt, 237 Mich. 38, 211 N. r. 115 (1926) (public right of fishing held to ex-
tend to all navigable waters).
20. See 27 HARv. L. Rxv. 750 (1914); 16 MIcE. L. Rav. 37 (1917).
21. See Note, 12 TEXAS L. REV. 72 (1933). When in England and this country
fishing was generally done by traps affixed to the stream bed, the policy of private
fishing rights in the riparian owner was in the public interest. But it has been
suggested that where, as is now the practice in this country, inland fishing is done
for sport with hook and line there is really no property interest attached to the right
of fishing. See I FARNHAM, WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS 171 (1904).
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